Delusions in Context by Bortolotti, Lisa
 
 
Delusions in Context
Bortolotti, Lisa
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-97202-2
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Bortolotti, L (ed.) 2018, Delusions in Context. Pivot, Palgrave. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97202-2
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
Delusions 
in Context
Edited by
Lisa Bortolotti
Delusions in Context
Lisa Bortolotti
Editor
Delusions in Context
This book is an open access publication.
ISBN 978-3-319-97201-5    ISBN 978-3-319-97202-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97202-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018952069
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer 
International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018
Open Access  This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the book’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly 
from the copyright holder.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this 
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are 
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information 
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the 
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The 
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.
Cover pattern © Melisa Hasan
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature 
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Editor
Lisa Bortolotti
Philosophy Department and Institute for Mental Health
University of Birmingham
Birmingham, UK
vThis book gathers some influential views about the relationship between 
delusional and non-delusional beliefs, and seeks to provide the resources 
for a better understanding of delusions by considering the clinical, psycho-
logical, philosophical, social, and cultural context in which delusional 
beliefs are adopted and maintained.
The views defended in the four self-standing chapters comprising this 
book come from experts in different disciplinary areas and reflect a variety 
of perspectives on the study of delusions and mental health in general, 
encompassing lived experience, psychology, philosophy, and cognitive 
neuropsychiatry. The contributors powerfully converge in describing 
delusions as beliefs that share some of their characteristics with non- 
delusional beliefs, all the while acknowledging that the concept belief 
needs to undergo some significant revision in order to capture the relevant 
features of human psychology. Notwithstanding some differences in 
emphasis, Rachel Upthegrove, Richard Bentall, Philip Corlett, and I com-
mit to the thesis that there is significant continuity between delusional and 
non-delusional beliefs, and defend the importance of examining delusions 
in the context in which they emerge.
One thought that echoes in the four chapters is that, for all the effort 
that has been made in providing a satisfactory definition of delusion, key 
features of delusions can be found in many beliefs that we do not usually 
regard as symptoms of mental distress. There are some examples of this 
thesis throughout the book. In Chap. 1, Rachel Upthegrove and her co- 
author S.A. write that “outside of mental illness, beliefs in God, aliens, 
political ideologies etc. can be equally fixed, if not more so, on less 
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 evidence” than delusional beliefs. This is a powerful statement, especially 
considering that fixity and lack of supporting evidence are regarded both 
as defining features of delusions and as reasons for regarding delusions as 
irrational and pathological.
In Chap. 2, Philip Corlett observes that, when faced with a belief, it is 
not always easy to determine whether it is delusional. “Of every 3 
Americans, 2 believe that advertisements contain subliminal messages; 
1 in 5 would be afraid to sail through the Bermuda Triangle, a similar ratio 
expressed interest in joining the Freemasons.” The point of the examples 
Corlett refers to is that conspiracy theories and superstitious thinking also 
feature fixed beliefs that lack supporting evidence, and yet they are very 
widespread and not symptomatic of mental distress.
In Chap. 3, Richard Bentall characterises delusions as master interpre-
tive systems, a new interesting notion aimed at capturing networks of inter-
related beliefs that apply to multiple life domains, are not easily refuted, 
and become part of our identity. Delusions here are compared to political 
ideologies and religious beliefs, and a case is made for relying on that com-
parison between them when tackling delusions as a symptom of mental 
distress.
Finally, in Chap. 4, I remark how the epistemic features of delusions in 
terms of ill-groundedness and imperviousness to evidence are common in 
prejudiced and superstitious beliefs. I focus on the similarities between 
delusions and optimistically biased beliefs, observing that,  despite the 
shared epistemic faults, delusions are thought to affect psychological well-
being negatively, whereas optimistically biased beliefs are found to have a 
variety of beneficial effects on functioning.
How can we understand the adoption and maintenance of delusional 
beliefs? There are two main messages in the book. One is that there are 
elements of continuity between delusional experiences and many of our 
everyday experiences, and between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. 
The other is the irrationality and pathological nature commonly attributed 
to delusions appear as much less exotic and un-understandable when we 
consider delusions in context, that is, in the context of our emotional and 
cognitive profiles, our life histories, our other commitments and beliefs, 
the social and cultural groups to which we belong, and more generally the 
way in which we learn about, and make sense of, the world around us.
Both messages lie at the core of project PERFECT (Pragmatic and 
Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts 
2014–2019), a five-year project hosted by the University of Birmingham 
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and funded by the European Research Council that I have the privilege to 
lead. It is thanks to the generous support of PERFECT that I had the 
opportunity to meet Rachel, Philip, and Richard and exchange some ideas 
with them, after following and admiring their work for years. The project 
has also enabled me to take the time to conceive of the present volume as 
a means of continuing our  exchange and inviting others to join the 
conversation. 
I hope you will see Delusions in Context as evidence that we need open 
dialogue and genuine collaboration between experts from different disci-
plines and with different interests and perspectives in order to turn one of 
the mind’s most fascinating mysteries, the adoption and maintenance of 
delusional beliefs, into a tractable problem, and help people whose lives 
are disrupted by delusions along the way.
Birmingham, UK Lisa Bortolotti
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CHAPTER 1
Delusional Beliefs in the Clinical Context
Rachel Upthegrove and S. A.
Abstract Delusional beliefs are key symptoms of mental illness, and phy-
sicians over hundreds of years have attempted to understand and offer 
treatments for patients with such beliefs. In this chapter, the authors will 
explore the experience of delusional beliefs within the clinical context: i.e. 
with people who present to mental health services for help. The authors 
begin with definition of the descriptive psychopathology, prevalence and 
context in which delusional beliefs occur and their clinical relevance. 
Delusional beliefs have a core role in distress, depression and risk within 
R. Upthegrove (*) 
Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK 
Birmingham Early Intervention Service, Birmingham, UK
e-mail: R.Upthegrove@bham.ac.uk 
S. A. 
Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Rachel Upthegrove would like to acknowledge the support, enthusiasm and 
dedication of staff, patients and carers from the Birmingham Early Intervention 
Service.
S.A. is a Trainee Clinical Psychologist with lived experience of psychosis. The 
“Healing Healer”? A Psychologist’s Personal Narrative of Psychosis and Early 
Intervention is published in Schizophrenia Bulletin, sbx188, https://doi.
org/10.1093/schbul/sbx188.
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psychosis. Real examples will be used to reflect on both the form delu-
sional beliefs take and their personal content, concluding with treatment 
options and challenges.
Keywords Delusions • Descriptive psychopathology • Distress • 
Phenomenology • Treatment options • Suicide
1.1  Why Are PsychiAtrists concerned 
With the ‘treAtment’ of Beliefs?
Patients, or at times family members advocating on someone’s behalf, 
present to health services in distress and seeking help. In a direct first per-
son account, S.A. explains her experiences of delusional beliefs with 
candour:
It is said that even Mother Teresa doubted her faith, yet her religious beliefs 
directly influenced her charitable actions. Unlike Mother Teresa, my delu-
sions had no room for doubt. I was convinced there was a “Challenge” 
which placed me at the centre of an elaborate scheme to test my suitability 
for university. “The Challenge” consumed my every being. As part of it I 
believed people were recording every thought and every word I spoke. I 
believed that food and drink were poisonous, which led me to not eating or 
drinking for four days. Unlike Mother Teresa, there was no good in my 
belief systems: only terror, anguish and exhaustion.
I was relieved that medication reduced the intensity of my experiences 
over time. My delusional beliefs eventually subsided, after which I felt an 
incredible sense of loss that things I concretely experienced were in fact my 
mind’s creation.
I never want to face the horror of a delusion state again, and fortunately 
I have received mostly excellent care from psychiatric services. Without 
treatment, I wouldn’t have been able to go back to leading a “normal” life 
and certainly wouldn’t be training as a Clinical Psychologist. My personal 
and clinical experience makes me believe delusions are distinct from other, 
more helpful beliefs, and it is inhumane not to offer people evidence-based 
treatments for them.
S.A.’s direct account captures the immediacy of delusional experience 
with eloquence and candour, and conveys the clinical need for interven-
tion to alleviate distress, but also the need for action in the face of real 
physical impact: S.A. had withheld food and fluid for a number of days. 
R. UPTHEGROVE AND S. A.
 3
This is not a sustainable situation and medicine has this need for action in 
response to pain and suffering at its core. In the absence of risk or help 
seeking, psychiatrists and other doctors are not ‘thought police’ and could 
not enforce contact or treatment. This is not to deny the abuse of medi-
cine, and psychiatry as a branch of medicine, in darker periods of history; 
in Soviet countries in the 20th century amongst other examples. Medicine 
and psychiatry sit within, and are part of, society. It is our social structure 
and cultural framework that gives context to what defines what are bizarre 
versus acceptable beliefs. It is thus very evident that we should never lose 
help-seeking and alleviation of distress or risk as the cornerstone for a psy-
chiatrist’s role in treating delusions.
1.2  PrevAlence of delusionAl Beliefs
Delusions rarely occur in isolation. The lifetime prevalence of delusional 
disorder, defined as the presence of delusional beliefs but no other symp-
toms of psychosis, is around 0.18%, in comparison to 3.78% for all other 
psychotic disorders (Perälä et al., 2007). This is relevant when discussing 
the context in which beliefs seen in a clinical setting develop, and are held. 
Delusions are a core feature of schizophrenia, occurring in around 70%, 
most commonly with concomitant hallucinations and grouped as “posi-
tive symptoms” (Fenton, McGlashan, Victor, & Blyler, 1997). In bipolar 
disorder, there is less literature charting the occurrence of delusions; simi-
lar to the presence of mood symptoms in ‘non-affective psychoses’ such as 
schizophrenia, the presence of psychosis in affective disorders at a symp-
tom specific level has not been the major focus of attention. However, our 
previous work demonstrated that up to 70% of people with bipolar disor-
der would experience psychotic symptoms (lifetime prevalence) with 65% 
having delusional beliefs (Upthegrove, Chard, et al., 2015). This occurs 
mostly within an elevated mood (mania) with mood congruent delusions. 
In major depressive disorder, delusional beliefs are seen in around 20%, 
mainly the context of severe psychotic depression. Kelleher et al. have also 
recently demonstrated psychotic symptoms occurring through the range 
of ‘non-psychotic’ disorders, regardless of severity, and in the general pop-
ulation (Kelleher & Cannon, 2011). In DSM-5, “Obsessive-Compulsive 
and Related Disorders” includes a specific reference to ‘delusional insight’: 
whereby the obsessional thought is no longer recognised as erroneous, 
but held with conviction (APA, 2013). In DSM-V delusional disorder 
itself now has an exclusion criterion, that symptoms cannot be better 
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explained by obsessive-compulsive disorder or similar disorder presenting 
with a lack of insight. In young people first presenting with mental health 
problems, in the first development of mental health disorders, diagnostic 
uncertainty is prominent. In first episode services, delusions are seen in 
70% of patients across affective and non-affective psychosis (Upthegrove 
et al., 2010). Thus, in classification terms delusional beliefs are now not 
seen wholly or exclusively indicative of psychosis, and this is novel. Whilst 
hallucinations have long been recognised to occur in non-psychotic disor-
ders, including epilepsy, personality disorder and post traumatic stress dis-
order (Pierre, 2010), delusional beliefs were not; as Jaspers wrote “to be 
mad is to be deluded” (Jaspers, 1997).
Within psychosis delusions usually are seen as one of many symptoms, 
including hallucinations, disordered thinking, cognitive challenges and 
changes in mood. In phenomenological terms, when considering a belief 
or experience and the need to describe it, in and of its own appearance, this 
is within the content of our own and another’s inward concerns: we aim to 
understand and work with people (Broome, 2013). In psychosis, other 
positive and affective symptoms will impact the way delusions develop, are 
conveyed and their personal impact. Bebbington and Freeman recently 
argue for a transdiagnostic extension of delusions to be explored as an 
experience in bipolar disorder and delusional disorders as well as in schizo-
phrenia: arguing that symptoms (such as mood disorder and delusions) 
covary because of a causal interaction between symptoms (Bebbington & 
Freeman, 2017). This proposal in entirely in keeping with the premise of 
this chapter; where we aim to lay out an understanding of the clinical 
importance of delusional beliefs within the context in which they develop.
1.3  Phenomenology of delusions
Delusions are commonly defined as fixed, false beliefs held with certainty 
and not in keeping with usual social and cultural context. Delusions have 
been described as a perverted view on reality, held with unusual convic-
tion, not amenable to logic and with their absurdity or erroneous content 
easily manifest to others (Oyebode, 2014).
S.A. writes:
I believed there were microphones (“bugs”) in my ears that I could switch 
on and off. This belief was not even shaken when a doctor looked in my ears 
and confirmed (surprise, surprise) that there weren’t any bugs in there.
R. UPTHEGROVE AND S. A.
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Historically, diagnostic weight is given in the distinction between pri-
mary delusions, which arise in the absence of other symptoms (a rare 
occurrence), and secondary delusions, which are secondary to other psy-
chopathology e.g. hallucinations or mood disorder, and are thus under-
standable in circumstances presented to the individual. For example, a 
person with mania believing they are a prophet, alternatively with severe 
depression believing they are guilty for all the evil in the world. The impor-
tance is not theoretical, but guides the emphasis of treatment: i.e. focus on 
the primary cause, in these examples the focus of treatment would be on 
the mania or depression. In schizophrenia, delusions may be secondary to 
a range of other positive symptoms (hallucinations, disorganisation) or 
occur in their primary form:
Andrew walks in to the clinic, clutching a carrier bag, beaming. Despite his 
many personal challenges, depression has never been a feature of Andrew’s 
presentation. Today however, he is positively upbeat and clearly desperate to 
show me what is in the bag. ‘I’ve got it doc, I’ve got proof! Once you see 
this you will know I am a psychic’. Andrew produces a slightly dog-eared 
certificate, issued by one of the growing 24-hour psychic TV channels, cer-
tifying that he is a Medium. Andrew has paid £1000 for this, and with fur-
ther investment he tells me he will be allowed to receive live calls from the 
public for telepathic readings. Andrew believes that his talents have brought 
him to the attention of MI5 and the CIA, who are working together to put 
him through psychic training by ‘telepathically torturing’ him until an unde-
fined point in the future, when he will have passed their initiation, and 
become a member of an elite telepathic spy ring. His feels this job on TV 
will keep him busy until this day, and his destiny is revealed. His beliefs have 
been firm for nearly 5 years. The torture he experiences takes place by way 
of the secret services moving various organs in his body, with a considerable 
amount of perceived pain, and by them inducing sensations in his rectum 
and bowels of being raped, together with many voices and tactile hallucina-
tions of being punched, touched and at times even tickled.
Like the back pay from his disability benefits payment, Andrew uses his 
latest piece of evidence to reinforce his beliefs and with a kind, benevolent 
disposition takes the clinical teams continued non-committed response as a 
further sign that the conspiracy is indeed well hidden. We are mere pawns in 
the bigger game.
Andrew believes he is telepathic and this belief is false, and fixed. It 
could be debated as to whether it is out of keeping with his social and 
cultural background, as a belief in telepathy will be shared by a number of 
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individuals in modern society. However, Andrew’s belief arises secondary 
to his array of tactile, somatic and auditory hallucinations. He uses exten-
sive and increasing information to reinforce his firm belief and discounts 
evidence that challenges his conviction.
None of the premises for defining delusions are set in stone (that they 
are fixed and false beliefs) and each point is are open to challenge. 
However, the presence, clinical relevance and reality of delusions are not 
belied by the difficulty in definition. Outside of mental illness, beliefs in 
God, aliens, political ideologies etc. can be equally fixed, if not more so, 
on less evidence than Andrew may acquire. Insight may come and go, 
and with this the fixed nature of delusions. Delusions may not be neces-
sarily false, and occur within a cultural and social context for every indi-
vidual. Yet despite the readily apparent difficulty in definition, delusions 
remain a cornerstone of the diagnosis of psychosis and severe mental ill-
ness. In asking why psychiatry is so pre-occupied with these erroneous 
beliefs, it is always important to consider the context within which they 
arise (i.e. rarely in isolation), but primarily the distress and negative 
impact they can bring.
1.4  from JAsPers to the modern erA
Karl Jaspers wrote his General Psychopathology in 1913, based on years of 
detailed clinical assessments of patients with (pharmacologically) untreated 
mental illness. In describing delusions, Jaspers lays out a two-step process; 
delusional atmosphere and the crystallisation of this into delusions proper 
(Jaspers, 1997). Jaspers and then Hagen developed the idea of delusional 
atmosphere to delusional mood; both authors describing a period of 
uncertainty, of being aware something is changed:
‘Patients feel uncanny, and as though something suspicious is afoot. 
Everything gets a new meaning. The environment is somehow different – 
not to a gross degree….’ The experience of delusional atmosphere or 
mood is uncomfortable, and the ‘full strength of intelligent personality’ is 
called in to understand the experience. Thus, the delusion proper which 
follows is to some extent a reasoning or resolution of this change (Jaspers, 
1997; Stanghellini & Fuchs, 2013).
S.A. writes:
At an earlier stage of my illness it felt as though the atmosphere of the earth 
had changed in some way that was difficult to put my finger on. I believe my 
R. UPTHEGROVE AND S. A.
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later delusions about being analysed and controlled by others arose from 
this feeling of something being different, and was a way of my brain trying 
to explain it.
Maj highlights that Jaspers’ account of delusional atmosphere was in 
itself an unpleasant experience, often accompanied by mood symptoms, ‘a 
distrustful, uncanny tension invades… they suffer terribly… no dread is 
worse than the dread unknown’ (Maj, 2013). The resolution of this uncom-
fortable atmosphere, delusional belief formation, was seen as a resolution 
of tension, conflict in thought and experience.
Over a century  after Jaspers, the idea of delusional mood has re- 
emerged, with Kapur’s model of aberrant salience, further developed by 
Mishara and Fusar-Poli (Kapur, 2003; Mishara & Fusar-Poli, 2013). The 
primary difficulty they propose lies in dopamine firing independent of cue. 
In usual semantic memory development and retrieval, sub-second aware-
ness of the significance of an environmental stimulus is needed, all the 
time. However, we lack the time and ability to constantly consciously 
ascertain the significant signal; e.g. food, to assess the shape, colour, smell 
etc. Seen once, a tiger will remain threatening in our memory and one will 
always remember the smell, texture and taste of chocolate. These semantic 
memories are hard wired, quickly, through a salience dopamine pathway.
There is increasing evidence that in psychosis, increase release and 
unconnected triggering of dopamine occurs (Murray et al., 2008). This is 
a much more nuanced understanding than an excess of dopamine leading 
to psychosis. Dopamine is a key neurochemical for memory and memory 
retrieval, and is increased at a cellular sub-second threshold when one is 
confronted with important information (the tiger or chocolate). If this 
firing happens independent of cue, as is proposed, supposedly neutral 
objects or pieces of information may assume significance; the environment 
somehow seems different, benign objects acquire special meaning. 
Inappropriate salience is assigned to external and internal stimuli; thus, a 
passing car becomes perplexing, or perceived as a threat, memories become 
pre-occupying or take on new significance.
More recent meta-analysis have confirmed dopamine dysregulation 
in psychosis; with the summary of findings being increased dopamine 
synthesis capacity, dopamine release and synaptic concentrations, the 
sum result of which is increased availability of dopamine to be present 
‘independent of cue’ (Howes et al., 2012). Furthermore, key dopamine 
and salience networks in the brain have consistently been shown to be 
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functioning differently in patients with psychosis. We are now aware 
that the brain changes in psychosis will not be related to one area or 
region, or on indeed one chemical, however certain brain networks of 
neuronal connections are increasingly recognised as important in our 
higher order thinking.
The Salience Network consists of the anterior cingulate cortex and 
anterior insula and, in health, is involved when our attention is needed- it 
will activate when we need to attend. The Default Mode Network, con-
sisting of the posterior cingulate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, inferior 
parietal cortex and angular gyrus, is active when we are not attending (e.g. 
day dreaming) and the Central Executive Network is involved in our deci-
sions around what is important to attend to, and processing and respond-
ing to the complex information. Individuals with psychosis have structural, 
functional and neurochemical changes within these three networks and 
how they activate; Palaniyappan, Mallikarjun and Liddle propose switch-
ing is a key difficulty; with default mode downregulation not occurring 
when it should, leading to inappropriate significance being placed on pre-
viously benign signals and delusional interpretation of external or internal 
cues (Palaniyappan, Mallikarjun, Joseph, White, & Liddle, 2011).
Whilst Jaspers was writing about the phenomenology and subjective 
patient experiences, of distress, delusional mood and the need for resolu-
tion, there is a wealth of information now available that builds on this in 
our understanding of the context in which delusional beliefs are formed; 
within the context of a change in brain function. In keeping with the ten-
ant of this chapter, however, it should be noted that these changes are not 
necessarily specific to delusions over and above other positive symptoms; 
hallucinations may equally be attributable to dopamine activation inde-
pendent of cue, with that cue being our own inner speech and salience 
network dysfunction, or the failure to down regulate the default mode 
network result internal processes being experienced as heard perceptions 
(Upthegrove, Ives, et  al., 2016). The intricate need for understanding 
hallucinations and delusions together remains prominent. Primary delu-
sions, the springing to mind of fully formed beliefs, complex and fixed, 
 sometimes preceded by a mood of disquiet (delusional mood), are rarely 
captured. Current understanding and research in delusional beliefs is 
largely based on persecutory beliefs, as a continuum approach, or second-
ary delusions.
R. UPTHEGROVE AND S. A.
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1.5  Psychosis continuum
In the past 20  years, the early identification of psychosis has become a 
priority, based on the knowledge that a longer duration of untreated psy-
chosis is associated with poorer outcomes, functional decline and risk. In 
the UK and Australia, Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIP) services have 
been set up with the aim of early identification of young people with first 
episode psychosis, and also those at risk of developing psychosis. Criteria 
for ‘Ultra High Risk’ (UHR) patients, i.e. those at higher risk of develop-
ing psychosis, but not yet psychotic, and the concept of an ‘At Risk Mental 
State’ (ARMS) includes at the heart a definition of a psychosis as the pres-
ence of positive symptoms, including delusions, and that this psychosis 
exists in a continuum between normal experience and illness (Marwaha, 
Thompson, Upthegrove, & Broome, 2016). EIP services often offer sup-
port and treatment to individuals who may be at high risk of developing 
psychosis, before frank illness is present, before positive symptoms includ-
ing delusions are fully developed. In work by Yung et  al. (Yung et  al., 
2008; Yung et  al., 2005), ARMS young people are defined as a help- 
seeking population with either low grade or frequency psychotic like 
symptoms, very brief self-resolving periods of delusional like thinking and 
a family history of psychosis along with functional decline. Low-grade 
psychotic like symptoms may include unusual thoughts or non-bizarre 
ideas that are not held with a fixed belief, or if they are, they are brief and 
limited, resolving without interventions. As a group, their relative risk of 
developing full psychosis in a 3-year period is around 500 times that of the 
general population (Nelson et al., 2013).
There remains the need for valid biological markers of a psychosis con-
tinuum and the staged model of psychotic illness, to aid accuracy of pre-
diction of future psychosis and staged interventions. However, Reniers 
and colleagues recently demonstrated a neurobiological signature for 
poorer functional outcome in the ARMS group, consisting of reduced 
grey matter density in bilateral frontal and limbic areas, and left cerebel-
lum, which may be more clinically relevant than transition to a pre- 
determined definition of psychosis (Reniers et al., 2017). Structural brain 
alterations are clearly present in those who have schizophrenia and related 
psychoses, including increase in ventricular volume and reduced grey and 
white matter. It has also been shown that these changes are present before 
the onset phase of frank psychosis (Smieskova et al., 2010). The majority 
of UHR individuals do not transition to psychosis but many continue to 
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have other poor outcomes and lower functioning (Reniers et al., 2017). 
However the point here is firstly that it is proposed that delusions may 
exist on a continuum and that positive symptoms are conceptualized 
together, frequently co-occurring. Their sum total is more than the indi-
vidual experience of one in isolation, but may not be the most relevant 
feature of how one functions in the world.
Cornblatt and colleagues propose a dimension of UHR status that has 
an underlying vulnerability for positive psychotic symptoms driven to clin-
ical significance by cognitive deficits, mood disturbances, social isolation, 
and school failure (Cornblatt et  al., 2003). An alternative approach to 
recognizing developing psychosis before frank delusions are present has 
been proposed within the European tradition of Basic Symptoms. 
Schultze-Lutter and Ruhrmann developed UHR criteria based on basic 
symptoms as a complement to attenuated positive symptoms, and this aids 
predictive validity of psychosis risk (Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, Berning, 
Maier, & Klosterkötter, 2008). Basic symptoms are subtle, sub-clinical 
self-experiences such as disturbances in drive, stress tolerance, attention, 
thinking, speech, perception and motor action. First described by Huber, 
they are based in the subjective understanding of difference from a ‘nor-
mal’ self (Huber & Gross, 1989). Ruhrmann proposes that basic symp-
toms are compensated for by increasing effort, not available to observation 
from others, and are recognized by an individual as a product of their own 
mind (Schultze-Lutter, Klosterkötter, & Ruhrmann, 2014). With rele-
vance to delusions, cognitive basic symptoms include disturbances in 
thought processing such as thought blockages, perseveration and pres-
sure. Broome demonstrated individuals at high risk of psychosis were 
more likely to jump to conclusions (JTC) on the basis of less information 
when cognitive demands are high (Broome et al., 2007). Subjects at high 
risk of psychosis and controls completed a bead-jar task, where by deci-
sions on which of two jars with different numbers of coloured beads are 
made when a varying number of beads are shown. A JTC bias is seen when 
subjects make a decision about which jar on fewer number of beads. When 
involved in an additional working memory task, subjects with high levels 
of delusional like thinking were more likely to show a jumping to conclu-
sions bias. Thus the primary cognitive difficulty or working memory was 
managed by decision-making at an earlier stage. A subtle compensatory 
response to basic cognitive disturbance demonstrates that even at the first 
delusional belief formation stage, the influence of other ‘symptoms’ or 
processes are key (Garety & Freeman, 1999).
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1.6  delusions in context
As illustrated in Andrew’s presentation, delusional beliefs in frank psycho-
sis do not occur in isolation, and the understanding of their experience 
requires appreciation of the wider context. As illustrated in S.A.’s account, 
for many people delusional beliefs are terrifying, consuming experiences, 
directly related to depression or severe anxiety. Delusional belief may arise 
secondary to, or in conjunction with, other symptoms; believing that you 
are being followed as the result of a voice telling you this  happening, 
believing there are telepathic cameras in the walls because somehow your 
thoughts are being broadcast on the radio. These beliefs are understand-
able, and have logic. In Jaspers’ view these would be delusion-like ideas, 
and not ‘true’ delusions (Oyebode, 2014). It must be emphasised that the 
historical context of the phrase ‘true delusions’ or ‘delusions proper’ did 
not negate the significance or distress of Jaspers’ concept of delusion-like 
ideas, but underlied that there was significance in the cognitive process 
and the treatment implications that primary delusions bring.
Delusions and Hallucinations: Positive Symptoms
As rehearsed above, the majority of patients will experience both delu-
sional beliefs and hallucinations together as part of ‘positive symptoms’ of 
psychosis. Their experiences are interdependent, and can have a combined 
significant bidirectional impact on an individual’s distress, help seeking 
behaviour and functioning. When investigating the experience of halluci-
nations in psychosis, this intricate relationship is clear; how one interprets 
early hallucinatory experiences, attributes cause and meaning to voice con-
tent is significant in psychosis. Delusional interpretation of hallucinations 
is common, particularly in developing illness.
S.A. remarks:
I believe that my delusion that the water supply had been contaminated 
was as a result of the water itself tasting different (i.e. a gustatory 
hallucination).
In a phenomenological study investigating the subjective experience of 
voice hearing in 25 young people with first episode psychosis, first person 
accounts show that hallucinations were characterized by an experience of 
entity: as though from a living being with complex social interchange and 
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control. Voices were often percived as speaking as an expert authority, able 
to control individuals, received with passivity and accompanied by sensa-
tion in other modalities (Upthegrove, Ives, et  al., 2016). Thus, is not 
surprising that delusional beliefs of communication or possession were a 
common accompaniment such experiences. Direct quotes from individal 
experence give illustration below:
     ‘it’s like being possessed, you know. What can you do? What can you really 
do?’
     ‘it’s like I’m being held down’
     ‘I’m constantly caged in by voices’
     ‘my body will recognise it’
     ‘When they choose to talk to me, they choose to talk to me and they take 
over they take over the whole situation as it is at the time’
     ‘it’s out of my hands’
     ‘if it’s really strong, the pull, I just lose whole control of it’
The experience of voice hearing is often accompanied by a search for 
meaning, an understanding of what can be an unusual and isolating expe-
rience; shame, and self-stigma lead to and isolation and can result in indi-
viduals not discussing experiences with a trusted other, and searching for 
meaning on their own;
     ‘I don’t know what kind of game they’re playing but someone’s gonna 
end up getting hurt really bad if they keep it up, whether it’s me or them’
     ‘there must be a camera in the TV then, I mean I don’t give a shit’
     ‘Is there a solution, has someone else gone through this, is there informa-
tion on what I’m going through?’
     ‘I’ve experienced it for a good long time on my own because I was embar-
rassed by it so I did go internet’
     ‘made me think… is this really happening… I mean are these people being 
watched or something’
     ‘that’s probably why they’re using voices that you recognise from back in 
the day and it’s like “We use these to try to connect”’
Thus in our phenomenological study in first episode psychosis,  the 
experience of auditory hallucinations are much more than a mere auditory 
phenomenon. In a modern phenomenological investigation, without pre-
supposition, results echo known descriptive psychopathology. Novel find-
ings also emerged that may be features of hallucinations in psychosis not 
currently captured with standardized measures  used to assess voices in 
research and clinical settings. However the complex, personal and multi- 
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sensory nature of hallucinations is readily apparent. Hallucinations were 
received with passivity, and lead to the need to understand this experience, 
and for some individuals a delusional explanation.
Delusions and Mood
Garety and Freeman have long written on the centrality of mood symp-
toms (depressionand anxiety) in the maintenance of delusional beliefs. 
Persecutory delusions can be seen as beliefs of threat, and so share the 
subjectve experience of an anticipation of danger with anxiety disorders. 
People with persecutory delusions may act in ways, like those with anxiety 
disorder, to keep safe, and will thus avoid exposure to dis-confirmatory 
evidence (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001). However we have also 
shown the common occurrence of depression in developing and early psy-
chosis: and that this may indeed be more than a ‘comorbidity’ (Upthegrove, 
Marwaha, & Birchwood, 2016; Upthegrove, Ross, Brunet, McCollum, & 
Jones, 2014). Depression can be seen as a reaction to the threat posed by 
perceived persecutors, malevolent voices and engagement in safety behav-
iours leading to feelings of entrapment. Garety and Freeman’s work 
(Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2007) demonstrates the significance 
of safety behaviours in the development and maintenance of delusional 
belief and distress. This suggests the personal significance and reaction to 
perceived threat is more individually important than the severity of symp-
toms as measured by delusional conviction or voice frequency.
Our work has demonstrated that personal appraisal of anomalous expe-
riences may drive on-going emotional dysfunction and through this fur-
ther increases in the fixed nature of delusional beliefs. Thwarted escape, 
arrested flight and failure to exert or win control of symptoms through use 
of self-help or safety behaviours may drive further isolation, lack of expo-
sure to dis-confirmatory evidence and longer duration of untreated illness 
(Upthegrove, Marwaha, et al., 2016). Learned helplessness, in response 
to unrelenting positive symptoms also leads to depression until treatment 
or help finally arrives. This is in keeping with advances in our understand-
ing of anxiety and distress in psychosis whereby proneness to shame is 
driven by social anxiety disorder (Kesting & Lincoln, 2013; Rüsch, 
Angermeyer, & Corrigan, 2005).
Building on the importance of mood symptoms in the development 
and maintenance of positive symptoms, it is also proposed that the context 
of adverse experiences in childhood will lead to the development of nega-
tive schemas of the self and the world (the self as vulnerable and others as 
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dangerous) which facilitate the development of paranoid delusions 
(Birchwood et al., 2004; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 
2001).
S.A. writes:
The content of my delusions (e.g. being tested to see if I was ‘good enough’ 
for university) directly related to what I believed about myself, for instance 
that I was inferior to other people.
Birchwood and colleagues suggest that childhood experience of social 
adversity leads to the development of negative schemas involving social 
humiliation and subordination, which in turn may fuel paranoia 
(Birchwood et  al., 2004). Alternatively, within biological models of 
schizophrenia the experience of abuse is proposed to create vulnerability 
to psychosis through heightened stress reactivity and cortisol dysfunction 
(Cannon, Clarke, & Cotter, 2014; Catone et al., 2015). Etain and col-
leagues suggest that a dual role of genetic and environmental influences of 
socially and morally inappropriate rewards and parental attitudes during 
childhood induces affective dysregulation in the developing child that pre-
cedes the development of bipolar disorder (Etain, Henry, Bellivier, 
Mathieu, & Leboyer, 2008).
We have previously investigated delusions in bipolar  disorder, using 
data from 2019 participants from the Bipolar Disorder Research Network, 
the largest bipolar sample in the world, with lifetime-ever DSM-IV and 
lifetime-ever clinical characteristics including childhood trauma, pres-
ence/absence of specific delusions (including persecutory, grandiose, 
depressive, nihilistic, guilt, and reference); auditory hallucinations (includ-
ing mood congruent hallucinations, accusatory/abusive and running 
commentary) and visual hallucinations (including all visual and mood 
congruent visual hallucinations). We hypothesised adverse childhood 
events would show a significant association with positive symptoms driven 
by dysregulation of mood (mood congruent delusions and hallucinations) 
or with a persecutory or abusive content. However, our hypothesis was 
only partially upheld. We demonstrated significant associations between 
childhood abuse and hallucinations which are mood congruent, or with an 
abusive content. These types of hallucinations remained significantly asso-
ciated with childhood sexual abuse even after controlling for other factors 
such as cannabis misuse. Significant associations were also found for other 
types of adverse childhood life events, including the experience of bullying 
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and hallucinations but there was not an increased risk of delusional beliefs, 
or in any sub type of delusional beliefs, in those with childhood traumas 
(Upthegrove, Chard et al., 2015).
In this respect, our results were contrary to studies in schizophrenia, or 
in those sampling from a population based cohort investigating associa-
tions between childhood trauma and persecutory ideation. However, the 
majority of this research concerning childhood adverse experiences and 
psychosis tend to show childhood emotional and sexual abuse are most 
notably associated with auditory hallucinations; Daalman and colleagues 
found that psychotic patients with auditory verbal hallucinations were 3 
times more likely to be victims of childhood sexual abuse and over 5 times 
more likely to have suffered emotional abuse than healthy controls 
(Daalman et al., 2012). In fact, relatively few studies have shown a direct 
relationship between childhood trauma and fully formed delusions in clin-
ical samples specifically. It may well be that the relationship between child-
hood events and psychosis is more symptom-specific than first proposed or 
that hallucinations are the mediating step between trauma and delusional 
beliefs. This will have relevance through the whole psychosis spectrum, 
however the weight of symptoms may differ across an affective load. An 
alternative explanation may be that in bipolar disorder, where there is less 
cognitive impairment compared to core schizophrenia, the role of child-
hood trauma appears specific in the predisposition to hallucinations. 
Additional cognition inefficiency maybe needed for the pathway to be 
directly between trauma and delusional beliefs.
However, it is also possible that mood symptoms are intricately linked 
to delusional beliefs at the biological level. Regions critical to emotional 
processing are common in models of psychotic symptoms and include the 
hippocampus, insula and prefrontal cortex. These areas are implicated in 
both depression with psychosis and schizophrenia (Busatto, 2013). In 
broader terms of affective instability, there is some convergence of evi-
dence that alterations in amygdala activation is involved in difficulty in 
emotional processing, salience to emotional stimuli, and behavioural 
response (Broome, He, Iftikhar, Eyden, & Marwaha, 2015). This may not 
only explain some of the commonality in biological findings across psy-
chotic mood disorders and schizophrenia, but provides potential aetio-
logical pathways.
Recently we have proposed that mood may drive forward further symp-
tom dimensions in psychosis, including delusional beliefs, through a 
stress-inflammation-structural brain change pathway. Evidence shows that 
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first episode schizophrenia and first episode affective psychosis have similar 
changes in brain structure, although progressive insular grey matter loss 
may be more pronounced in schizophrenia (Lee et al., 2015). Increase in 
stress reactivity seen in schizophrenia may be linked to inflammatory and 
structural brain changes (Lataster, Valmaggia, Lardinois, van Os, & Myin- 
Germeys, 2013). Hippocampal grey matter volume (GMV) reduction is 
found in unipolar depression, related to the duration of illness (Arnone 
et  al., 2013) but is also seen in schizophrenia. Inflammation mediated 
effects on brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) is a proposed path-
way for this effect (Mondelli et al., 2011). Changes in circulating inflam-
matory markers and neurotrophins associated with the onset of depression 
are also seen commonly in schizophrenia (Upthegrove, Manzanares- 
Teson, & Barnes, 2014); psychosis and depression may in combination be 
significant at a biological inflammatory level; Noto recently demonstrated 
that IL-6, IL-4, IL-10 and TNFα were significantly higher in this patient 
group (Noto et al., 2015).
In brain imaging using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
patients with depression and positive symptoms show similarly enhanced 
brain response to fearful facial expressions, particularly located to the thal-
amus (Kumari et al., 2015). Regions critical to emotional processing are 
common in models of psychotic symptoms and include the hippocampus, 
insula and prefrontal cortex and these areas are implicated in both depres-
sion with psychosis and schizophrenia (Busatto, 2013). There is also con-
vergence of evidence that alterations in amygdala activation is involved in 
difficulty in emotional processing, salience to emotional stimuli, and 
behavioral response as related to affective instability (Broome et al., 2015).
Delusions and PTSD
Around one in three people with psychosis report symptoms consistent 
with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and this can be related to the 
experience of positive symptoms themselves. Brunet et al. explored PTSD 
in relation to symptoms and the experience of psychosis in a community 
sample of patients with first episode psychosis. 31% met DSM-IV criteria 
for PTSD (Brunet, Birchwood, Upthegrove, Michail, & Ross, 2012), a 
figure in keeping with PTSD rates after national disasters, and higher than 
other man-made or technical incidents (Neria, Nandi, & Galea, 2008). In 
psychosis, more people still report distressing memories subthreshold for 
PTSD such that two thirds of people experienced distressing intrusive 
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memories at some level (Brunet et al., 2012). PTSD symptoms were often 
related to psychotic symptoms, which continued to distress participants 
longitudinally after their first acute episode. In relation to delusional 
beliefs, threatening persecutors were distressing. Chisholm et  al. previ-
ously demonstrated the appraisals of threat or harm arising from these 
experiences and the accompanying distress was associated with PTSD sta-
tus and severity and those with PTSD appraised their persecutors as more 
powerful, awful, deserved, and felt less in control or able to cope 
(Chisholm, Freeman, & Cooke, 2006).
S.A. writes:
Once I had recovered from my psychotic episode I struggled with distress-
ing memories of what had happened. I didn’t develop full PTSD but can 
understand why it is so common.
Delusions and Suicidal Thinking
In keeping with the premise the clinical context of this chapter, it is impor-
tant to rehearse suicidal thinking: a clear consequence of delusional beliefs 
over and above depression and distress. The intricate relationship between 
mood and delusions has significant consequence. Suicide in psychotic dis-
orders remains too frequent an event and a tragic, preventable loss of life 
with widespread impact to family, carers, friends and society. In our previ-
ous work in first episode psychosis, over 50% of individuals with psychosis 
reported clear thoughts of self-harm. 33% reported a lifetime history of 
suicidal behaviour and 30% had a history of suicidal behaviour in the devel-
oping months of first episode psychosis or during a period of untreated 
positive symptoms. Methods used in this cohort include overdose attempted 
hanging and jumping from a height (Upthegrove et al., 2010). The pres-
ence of depression significantly associated with the presence of acts of self-
harm. Our investigation of first episode psychosis  identified key variables in 
prediction of suicidal behaviour including male gender male, minority eth-
nicity grouping, substance abuse and a history of depression (Upthegrove 
et al., 2010). As we have previously rehearsed, depression can be experi-
enced as a complex reaction to psychosis, including delusional beliefs and 
the impact of psychosis, thwarted escape, self stigma and internalised shame 
contributing to a pathway of suicidal thinking (Fig. 1.1):
We have explored this model with qualitative methods using photo- 
elicitation, together with unstructured interviews, used to characterise 
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aspects of depression following FEP and analysed using contemporary 
framework analysis. Participants reported a long period of self reflection 
and an in-depth questioning of their illness events together with a diffi-
culty in trusting their own thoughts and experiences. See Fig. 1.2 and 
excerpts below from Sandhu et  al. (Sandhu, Ives, Birchwood, & 
Upthegrove, 2013):
‘That’s me describing my mind sometimes, it’s kind of like confusion … because 
after I had a psychosis episode, that’s how my mind was like, fully confused, and 
I couldn’t break out of it’.
Some participants extended the doubt of their thoughts and memories, 
and raised the possibility that they had been delusional for a much longer 
period than they originally thought. They also experienced confusion 
Engagement with
powerful malevolent
voices
Subordination to
Persecutors
Use of Safety 
Behaviours
Response by health
service 
DEPRESSION
HOPLESSNESS
SUICIDAL INTENT
High levels of self
criticism, poor problem
solving
Acute psychosis
Entrapment and demoralization
Fig. 1.1 Model of suicidal behaviour in psychosis
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about the present, and reported an increasing sense of mistrust of both 
their current thoughts and their current experience of “reality”:
‘I started to realise, if most of the things that I was scared about, and you 
know, a lot of my thoughts, were they to do with psychosis? … It’s come to 
the stage where I don’t one hundred percent trust myself.’
‘Once you realize that you’ve lost track of reality and your mind starts 
getting to grips with the fact that it was wrong, it was completely wrong for 
so long, I dunno, you kind of lose your confidence in your own judgment’
We also observed an overwhelming sense of shame, which strength-
ened participants’ feelings of loss and social withdrawal. There is sub-
stantial evidence that people with mental health disorders, particularly 
schizophrenia, are heavily subjected to stigma by society and individuals 
can internalize this stigma and suffer shame, loss of self esteem and iso-
lation (Staring, Van der Gaag, Van den Berge, Duivenvoorden, & 
Mulder, 2009). Superimposed onto these experiences, our findings sug-
gested an on-going relationship between these disempowering  appraisals 
Fig. 1.2 The participant reported with this illustration “for a big part of time I 
was like looking on the internet… trying to understand what’s happened to 
me…  there’s the part of this experience of ‘what’s going on?’ leads you to try and 
investigate”
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and fear of psychosis, and the return of delusional thinking adding to 
loss and isolation. Participants cited feeling safe in isolation, of wanting 
to be left alone. There was a perceived pressure to ‘be better’ once posi-
tive symptoms had abated; yet with little knowledge about how to begin 
this, adding to a sense of despair and demoralisation (Sandhu et  al., 
2013).
Formal comparison between social anxiety disorders and social anxiety 
in psychosis has recently revealed differing mechanisms involved in main-
taining anxiety in patients with psychosis; patients with psychosis experi-
encing more perceived threat and anticipated harm, without the presence 
of persecutory delusions. The suggestion is, similar to depression follow-
ing psychosis, different mechanisms may be involved when affective dys-
regulation occurs in psychosis (Michail & Birchwood, 2009).
1.7  therAPeutic oPtions
The first thing to note is that the treatment for delusional beliefs, like their 
development, does not occur in isolation. Patients present to services with 
the above rehearsed concomitant distress, hallucinations, depression or 
suicidal thinking. Therapeutic options are planned with the patient, and 
their personal formulation, as a whole. On occasion, delusional beliefs 
singularly come with actions that present significant risk to self or others 
and this may result in more coercive treatment frameworks, including that 
involving legislative frameworks. This latter scenario is outside of the scope 
of this chapter, and would warrant an additional rehearsal of ethical debate 
and therapeutic challenge. Thus, we will discuss treatment options that 
mental health professionals; psychiatrists, nurses and psychologists discuss 
with their help-seeking patient.
That said, risk assessment and management are core features of clinical 
services. As illustrated above, significant distress, suicidal thinking and 
actions can accompany delusional beliefs. At times services can struggle 
with the balance of individual autonomy versus interventions that may save 
lives, whilst still aiming to offer real clinical hope. The absolute need to 
engage therapeutically with people in the midst of extraordinary personal 
experiences are not easily captured or helped by dry definitions of psycho-
pathology, labelling symptoms, establishing diagnostic criteria or an under-
standing of the underlying neurobiology. In order to offer treatment and 
interventions, and reduce risk of suicide, there is a need to understand and 
empathise with an individual’s experience - to walk fully in someone else’s 
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shoes. This takes time and effort. Therapeutic engagement should be the 
starting point and continuing cornerstone of pharmacological or psycho-
logical treatments, which will not be accepted, or be effective, without.
S.A. writes:
Before I saw professionals from the Early Intervention Service I didn’t feel 
listened to or understood. My psychiatrist and CPN took time to listen to 
me and I felt they placed themselves alongside me rather than in a position 
of power. If they hadn’t taken time to get to know me I wouldn’t have felt 
able to trust them or the advice they gave me.
Medication
There is substantial and robust evidence that antipsychotic medication is 
effective in the treatment of positive symptoms of psychosis (i.e. delusions, 
hallucinations and disorganisation of thought). The British Association for 
Psychopharmacology (BAP) guidance summarised evidence that the 
majority of patients with positive symptoms will respond to antipsychotic 
medication and recommends that the choice of first-line antipsychotic 
drug should be based on the evidence for relative liability for side effects, 
individual patient preference, individual patient risk factors for side effects 
and relevant medical history. Antipsychotic medication should be initiated 
at the lower end of the licensed dosage range when first commenced and 
an individual trial of the antipsychotic of choice should be conducted: i.e. 
it is not advised, nor responsible, to continue prescription for medication 
which may have side effects but has not shown a therapeutic benefit. 
Clozapine should be considered for patients whose illness has shown a 
poor response to trials of two antipsychotic drugs that have been adequate 
in terms of dosage and duration (Barnes, 2011). With regard to delusional 
beliefs in particular, the duration of illness (untreated) is related to the 
effectiveness of pharmacological, and likely psychological, interventions: 
With many years to entrench belief systems, time to spend gathering evi-
dence and the potential progressive brain changes seen in the early years of 
psychosis, less response to therapies  may occur. Drake and colleagues 
clearly showed some time ago that the length of untreated psychosis cor-
responded to the severity of positive symptoms at first presentation and 
the response to treatment (Drake, Haley, Akhtar, & Lewis, 2000).
Similarly to BAP guidance, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) recommendations for the treatment of schizophrenia 
 DELUSIONAL BELIEFS IN THE CLINICAL CONTEXT 
22 
and psychosis include the prescription of an antipsychotic medication (in 
combination with psychological interventions) as the first step in the treat-
ment of psychosis (Kuipers, Yesufu-Udechuku, Taylor, & Kendall, 2014):
The choice of antipsychotic medication should be made by the service user 
and healthcare professional together, taking into account the views of the 
carer if the service user agrees. Provide information and discuss the likely 
benefits and possible side effects of each drug, including: metabolic (includ-
ing weight gain and diabetes) extrapyramidal (including akathisia, dyskinesia 
and dystonia) cardiovascular (including prolonging the QT interval) hor-
monal (including increasing plasma prolactin) other (including unpleasant 
subjective experiences).
NICE guidelines are not without controversy, as highlighted by open 
debate in the British Journal of Psychiatry (Kendall et al., 2016). NICE 
gives equal or indeed enhanced emphasis on psychological over pharma-
cological interventions, including cognitive behavioural therapy for psy-
chosis (CBTp) and art therapy, which have a considerably less developed 
evidence base and thus the guideline has been said to have shown a nega-
tive bias to drug treatment. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline 
Network (SIGN) is the Scottish equivalent to NICE. Whist both guide-
lines have a number of similarities, for example recommending the use of 
antipsychotics (including clozapine  when needed), family intervention, 
early interventions, assertive community treatment and CBTp, SIGN offer 
more extensive recommendation on pharmacological treatment, with 
some 60% of its recommendations devoted to pharmacological interven-
tions alone(Taylor & Perera, 2015). The argument of bias of NICE 
towards psychosocial interventions was felt to be based on a belief that 
antipsychotic medications are more potentially harmful. There is an 
absence of evidence for adverse effects of psychosocial interventions; how-
ever the argument is that the absence of evidence is not the same as evi-
dence of absence.
In terms of medication choice, as BAP guidance’s state, this should be 
based on individual patient presentation and choice, as there is no clear evi-
dence to suggest one antipsychotic medication is likely to be more effective 
than another within an individual patient trial with the exception of clozapine. 
The European First Episode Schizophrenia Trial (EUFEST) tested haloperi-
dol against several ‘second generation antipsychotic medications’ in first-epi-
sode schizophrenia and schizophreniform disorder. All medications showed 
an effect on positive symptoms with a mean symptomatic improvement of 
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more than 60% (Kahn et al., 2008), thus choice should be made on the bal-
ance of side effects, previous history of response and with patient choice.
S.A. writes:
It’s very important for clinicians to offer people a choice in the medication 
they are prescribed, and to be prepared to switch medications if the side 
effects can’t be tolerated. Personally I felt embarrassed about some of my 
side effects so I think it’s important clinicians ask about them directly.
In addition, epidemiological evidence is clear on the effectiveness, and 
safety, of antipsychotic medication. In a cohort of over 20,000 people in a 
Swedish database study demonstrated the effectiveness of antipsychotic 
medication in terms or treatment, prevention of relapse and hospitaliza-
tion. Clozapine and long acting injections were superior to other forms of 
medication, likely the result of increase efficacy (clozapine) and concor-
dance monitoring (both) (Tiihonen et al., 2017).
Lally et  al. have also recently demonstrated optimistic remission and 
recovery figures in treated first episode psychosis, with remission in nearly 
60% of people at 5 years remaining well (Lally, J. et al. 2017). Antipsychotic 
medication is effective in the prevention of relapse and randomized con-
trolled trials strongly support the efficacy of antipsychotics for the acute 
treatment of psychosis and prevention of relapse (Goff et al., 2017; Leucht 
et al., 2012) There is also growing opinion that a significant minority of 
people can remain well on very low dose medication after the treatment of 
the acute episode (Murray et  al., 2016). In contrast, meta-analysis 
 conducted by Vermeulen showed an increased long-term mortality risk in 
patients with schizophrenia who did not use antipsychotic medication 
during follow up (Vermeulen et al., 2017). Thus in clinical decision, indi-
vidual formulation including risks of relapse is needed, with careful con-
sideration of positive  effects  and side-effects of medication including 
propensity to cause sedation and weight gain or stiffness, rigidity and 
tremor, balanced by the prevention of return of delusions and hallucina-
tions, and reduced risk of suicidal behaviour (Barnes, 2011). A focus on 
the treatment of delusions beliefs themselves should not detract from effec-
tive treatments of the impact delusional beliefs may bring. We have recently 
demonstrated the effectiveness of antidepressants in the treatment of 
depression in schizophrenia (Gregory, Mallikarjun, & Upthegrove, 2017) 
and Helfer has also demonstrated the long term role of antidepressants in 
suicide prevention in psychotic disorders and their safe use in combination 
with antipsychotic medication (Helfer et al., 2016).
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Psychological Therapy
Cognitive therapy is a predominent psychological treatment is used in the 
majority of mental health disorders with differing levels of proven efficacy. 
Fairly robust evidence exists for Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) in 
depression and anxiety (Clark, 2011). Historically, the concept of psycho-
logical therapy for delusional beliefs was not encouraged: concern that 
targeting delusions directly was likely to make matters worse, within an 
understanding that delusions were not amenable to reason nor subject to 
‘normal’ mechanisms of learning, and therefore talking through the evi-
dence was counterproductive. In fact this position was unrelated to Jaspers 
first accounts of delusional beliefs and logical reasoning, which did not 
equate to a therapeutic nihilism, yet did lead to a lack of focus of psycho-
logical therapies for psychosis for some decades.
However Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for psychosis (CBTp) now has an 
evidence base, although the strength of this base is debated. The effective-
ness of CBTp has been assessed by measuring change in positive symptoms 
(hallucinations and delusions), negative symptoms, quality of life and func-
tioning such that CBTp is now recommended by National Guidelines as 
rehearsed above (Kuipers et  al., 2014). The effectiveness of psychological 
therapies are not uncontroversial as studies mostly compare CBTp to treat-
ment as usual (Kendall et al., 2016). When compared to an active compari-
son group, such as befriending, CBTp has less clear evidence. Turkington 
et al. demonstrate befriending to be particularly useful for persecutory delu-
sions (Turkington 2017). CBTp generally aims to reduce positive symptoms, 
negative symptoms and improves general functioning (Wykes, Steel, Everitt, 
& Tarrier, 2008) and national guidelines currently recommend CBTp for 
patients with schizophrenia in all phases of the disorder (Kuipers et al., 2014).
With respect to delusional beliefs, only a small number of studies have 
reported efficacy on delusional beliefs specifically in CBTp trials, or investi-
gated delusional beliefs as the primary outcome, with meta-analysis showing 
a smaller effect size on delusions compared to hallucinations (van der Gaag, 
Valmaggia, & Smit, 2014). Given the prevalence of persecutory as opposed 
to other delusions, those studies designed to assess the effect of CBTp on 
delusions mainly focus here. Freeman and et  al. examined the effect of 
CBTp on thirty participants in a single blind RCT and found a significant 
reduction in paranoia, but also significant improvements in well-being, self-
esteem and depression (Freeman et al., 2014). As rehearsed above, given 
the significance of depression and suicidal thinking in response to delusions 
and in the generation of positive symptoms, this is not unimportant.
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Although the evidence base for CBTp may be less than perfect, the his-
torical assumption that CBT should not be used in psychosis has been dis-
pelled. In practice, the objectives of psychological therapy are agreed by the 
patient and therapist in collaboration, and in psychosis may include distress-
ing beliefs, or depression or an entirely different focus. Changing a belief, 
‘getting rid’ of the delusions may well not be the focus of therapy, rather this 
may include stopping or reducing the time spent thinking about (or acting 
upon) a belief. However, when focused on delusional beliefs, Turkington 
proposes that during the cognitive therapy process, expectation is that even 
primary delusions might become more understandable as the patient’s life 
history and belief profile are made apparent. Techniques involved may 
include peripheral questioning and inference chaining to explore beliefs once 
a therapeutic alliance is formed (Turkington & Siddle, 1998). For example, 
with Andrew one might discuss an inference question chain such as:
Andrew: “MI5 are training me.”
Therapist: “What does it mean for you to believe this?”
Andrew: “There is a reason for everything I’ve been through.”
Therapist: “What does this mean to you to understand this?”
Andrew: “I will be rewarded, money, in the end, for what’s been done 
to me. I don’t want to have to do the work, I’d rather have a 
quiet life, but if I have to this, then maybe at least they will 
reward me”.
There is growing debate about the size of difference can be expected 
from CBTp; Jauhar found only small differences between CBTp and con-
trol groups, which were not significant when only studies that had an 
active control were pooled (Jauhar et  al., 2014). Publication bias and 
unblinded studies are also highlighted. A more recent meta-analysis of 19 
RCT’s comparing CBTp and reporting delusions as an outcome found a 
significant effect with a small to medium effect size that was maintained at 
42 weeks when compared to treatment as usual. However in sub-analysis 
of 8 studies that compared CBTp to another active psychological inter-
vention, there were no significant differences at end of therapy or later 
follow up (Mehl, Werner, & Lincoln, 2015). In later studies CBTp was 
compared to a wide range of interventions supportive counselling 
(Durham et  al., 2003; Lewis et  al., 2002; Valmaggia, Van Der Gaag, 
Tarrier, Pijnenborg, & Slooff, 2005), attention placebo (O’Connor et al., 
2007), psychoeducation (Cather et al., 2005) problem solving (Philippa A 
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Garety et  al., 2008; Tarrier et  al., 2014) and social activity therapy 
(Haddock, Lowens, Brosnan, Barrowclough, & Novaco, 2004).
NICE currently recommends CBTp, highlighting the importance of 
offering this in conjunction with antipsychotic medication, or on its own if 
medication is declined, as part of a broad-based approach that combines 
different treatment options tailored to the needs of individual service users 
(Kuipers et al., 2014). In summary, however it appears psychological ther-
apy may have a beneficial effect in delusional beliefs, and this may be in 
acting mainly on ‘peripheral’ but clinically useful targets of distress, depres-
sion and acting on beliefs rather than changing the core beliefs system itself.
1.8  conclusion
Psychiatrists are concerned with delusional beliefs because, as all physi-
cians should be, they are interested in human experience and driven by a 
need to offer therapeutic options to people in need. In general, we become 
physicians through a combined desire to understand the human condition 
and to help, be this though biological or other vehicles. The rich 
 descriptions of patient experience in individuals with delusional beliefs are 
unparalleled in other branches of medicine. Delusional beliefs are at the 
heart of psychiatry, capturing the essence of this drive to understand and 
offer real therapeutic opportunity, alleviate suffering, and improve lives. 
At its best this involves a shared understanding of the context of beliefs, 
personal meaning and impact. Increasingly we also understand more 
about the potential biological pathways to delusional thinking, and effec-
tiveness of both pharmacological and psychological interventions. 
However, the primacy remains of understanding the context in which 
delusional beliefs are experienced in the round; the role of delusional 
mood, depression, mania, hallucinations and other positive symptoms, 
trauma and distress. This has long been recognised to be at the heart of 
developing a therapeutic relationship, and only when this is established 
can treatment options be discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
Delusions and Prediction Error
Philip Corlett
Abstract Different empirical and theoretical traditions approach delu-
sions differently. This chapter is about how cognitive neuroscience – the 
practice of studying the brain to draw conclusions about the mind – has 
been applied to the problem of belief and delusion. In particular, the focus 
is on a particular bridging theory, that of predictive coding. This theory 
holds that the brain contains a model of the world (and the self as an agent 
in that world). It uses that model to make predictions in order to adapt to 
the environment. Errors in those predictions can garner belief updating or 
be ignored, depending on how each prediction error response sustains 
adaptive fitness. The discussion will cover how delusions might arise and 
be maintained under the influence of aberrant prediction errors and what 
psychological and neural mechanisms of prediction error processing per-
tain to delusions, comparing and contrasting the theory with other promi-
nent theories of delusions. The conclusion is that the single factor, 
prediction error account gives a parsimonious account of delusions that 
generates novel predictions about how best to treat delusions and incor-
porates numerous biological, clinical and phenomenological data regard-
ing delusions.
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2.1  A MillenniAl Cult And the PsyChology 
of delusion
Defining, explaining and ultimately understanding delusions has proven 
challenging. There are many instances of people adopting and acting upon 
beliefs that appear delusional, despite an apparent lack of serious mental 
illness.
One real-world historical example may be particularly instructive.
The Chicago Tribune reported, in December 1954, that Dr. Charles 
Laughead (a Christian with a fascination with UFOs) foresaw the end of 
the world. He was speaking on behalf of Dorothy Martin, who was sup-
posedly relaying a prophecy from extra-terrestrials from the planet Clarion. 
The prophecy of course did not manifest. Martin was placed in psychiatric 
care and charged with contributing to the delinquency of minors – the 
children that she and Laughead warned of the forthcoming apocalypse 
were so scared they had trouble sleeping.
Martin ultimately settled in Sedona, Arizona where she lived until she 
was 92, continuing to proselytize about aliens, but ultimately evading 
interaction with psychiatric services. Did Martin have delusions? What 
about her acolytes? Their beliefs were certainly bizarre and firm and occa-
sionally held with some distress. There is growing appreciation that strong 
beliefs and delusions exist on a continuum and may be difficult to distin-
guish (DSM-V). This is a challenge. However, there are also opportunities. 
The psychology and neurobiology of belief may inform our understanding 
and treatment of delusions – which is a clear unmet clinical need.
Unbeknownst to Martin and Laughead, some of their followers were 
social psychologists from the University of Minnesota, led by Leon 
Festinger. The academics studied the group as the end-times loomed, 
resulting in a book; ‘When Prophecy Fails: A social psychological study of a 
modern group that predicted the destruction of the world’ (Festinger, 
Riecken, & Schachter, 1956). The authors focused on cognitive  dissonance; 
the internal discord felt from holding conflicting beliefs simultaneously [in 
this case was between the prophecy and real-world events (Festinger, 
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1962)]. People in the cult acted to reduce their dissonance. Many dis-
avowed the apocalypse and left the group. However, some increased their 
conviction in the face of contradictory data. Martin’s failed predictions 
were re-contextualized as actually having come to fruition (a minor earth-
quake did occur in California). Confounded expectations were explained 
away (“the aliens did come for us, but they were scared off by the crowds 
of press”). These sleights of mind (McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005) 
will be familiar to those who have spoken to patients with delusions 
(Garety, 1991, 1992), who can respond to challenges to their beliefs by 
incorporating the challenging data, and sometimes the challenger, into 
their delusional narrative.
Cognitive dissonance contains the kernel of the prediction error 
account of delusions. In brief, when beliefs abut reality, prediction errors 
result – which are mismatches between expectation and experience. One 
may update one’s beliefs or ignore conflicting data – minimizing the con-
flict. When conflict is detected inappropriately, delusions result (Adams, 
Stephan, Brown, Frith, & Friston, 2013; Corlett, 2015; Corlett & 
Fletcher, 2014; Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009a; Corlett, Honey, & 
Fletcher, 2007; Corlett, Honey, Krystal, & Fletcher, 2010; Corlett, Taylor, 
Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Gray, Feldon, 
Rawlins, Hemsley, & Smith, 1991)
2.2  ReAsoning About beliefs fRoM biology, 
PsyChology, And Cognitive neuRosCienCe
Delusions are challenging to study in the laboratory – the sufferer often 
denies any problem (Gibbs & David, 2003) and does not present to clini-
cal attention until delusions are fully formed (Corlett et al., 2007). The 
neural correlates of hallucinations can be captured when people experienc-
ing them report their experiences in a functional imaging scanner 
(Zmigrod, Garrison, Carr, & Simons, 2016). Delusions on the other 
hand, do not typically wax and wane on a timescale that lends itself to such 
capture. Experimental models can provide a unique window onto an oth-
erwise inaccessible disease process (Corlett et al., 2007). Prior work has 
capitalized on one such drug model of delusions: ketamine; the NMDA 
glutamate receptor antagonist drug that transiently and reversibly 
 engenders delusion-like ideas in healthy people (Pomarol-Clotet et  al., 
2006) and other animals (Honsberger, Taylor, & Corlett, 2015).
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These delusions might be manifestations of aberrant prediction errors 
(Corlett, Taylor, et al., 2010), the mismatch between what we expect and 
what we experience (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Derived from formal 
learning theory to explain mechanisms of animal conditioning, prediction 
error (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) is signaled by dopamine and glutamate 
activity in the brain (Lavin et al., 2005). It has also become a key process 
in theoretical models of human causal learning and belief formation 
(Dickinson, 2001). By minimizing prediction error we model the causal 
structure of our environment (Dickinson, 2001). If prediction errors 
occur when they ought not to, aberrant associations are formed and 
strengthened, culminating in delusional beliefs.
Beliefs and the Brain
The cognitive neuroscience of belief has been slow to develop. The absence 
of a consilient psychological theory of belief formation led the late Jerry 
Fodor – both a philosopher and a cognitive scientist, to assert that, whilst 
beliefs are among the most interesting cognitive phenomena, they are not 
ready to be explained in the same cognitive and neural terms as more 
accessible processes, such as vision (Fodor, 1975, 2000). However, there 
are now cognitive and neural frameworks of belief (Dickinson, 2001) 
amenable to quantitative analysis and applicable to studies on healthy sub-
jects (Corlett et al., 2004) in clinical settings (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 
2009b; Corlett, Taylor, et  al., 2010), and across species (Dickinson, 
2001).
A Bridging Hypothesis: From Mind to Brain?
Associationists believe that the mind is a network of associations between 
ideas (Warren, 1921). It began with Plato (Plato, 350  B.C./1999). 
Aristotle outlined the first laws of association (Aristotle, 350 B.C./1930). 
John Locke described the role of improper association of ideas in mental 
illness (Locke, 1690/1976). David Hume added cause and effect (conti-
guity in time) as a law of association (Hume, 1739/2007). Pavlov explored 
the mechanisms of association empirically (Pavlov, 1927). His condition-
ing paradigms highlighted that mere contiguity is not sufficient for learn-
ing. For example, Leon Kamin discovered blocking, which involves the 
retardation of learning about a novel cue-outcome association when that 
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cue is paired with a stimulus that already predicts the outcome – the pre- 
trained cue blocks learning about the novel cue (Kamin, 1969). Blocking 
demands that the association of ideas is sensitive to surprise (McLaren & 
Dickinson, 1990).
Widrow and Hoff created a simple connectionist neural network of 
nodes, representing inputs and outputs as links between nodes (Widrow 
& Hoff, 1960). Those links were strengthened by reducing an error sig-
nal, the mismatch between the desired output from a given input and the 
output that actually occurred. A similar algorithm was proposed for animal 
conditioning by Rescorla and Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972); envi-
ronmental stimuli induce expectations about subsequent states of the 
world, exciting representations of those states. Any mismatch between the 
expectancies and actual experience is a PE. PEs are used as teaching signals 
to update future expectancies about stimuli and states. Under this scheme, 
blocking occurs because the outcome of the compound of pre-trained and 
novel cues is completely predicted, by the pre-trained cue, which pre-
cludes the generation of prediction error signal and, subsequently, learn-
ing about the association between the novel cue and the outcome. 
Consequently, a greater magnitude PE should weaken blocking. This has 
been demonstrated with amphetamine administration in experimental ani-
mals (O’Tuathaigh et al., 2003), chemogenetic manipulations of cingulate 
cortex in rats (Yau & McNally, 2015) and optogenetic manipulation of 
dopamine neurons in mice (Steinberg et al., 2013). In humans, weaker 
blocking has been observed in patients with schizophrenia (Moran, 
Al-Uzri, Watson, & Reveley, 2003) and the extent to which the neural PE 
signal is inappropriately engaged correlates with delusion-like beliefs 
(Corlett & Fletcher, 2012).
Attention is also critical for associative learning. Cues that are predict-
ably associated with important outcomes are allocated most attention, 
and thus more readily enter associative relationships (Mackintosh, 1975). 
However, stimuli with an uncertain predictive history also garner atten-
tion (Pearce & Hall, 1980). Clearly attention is important to association 
formation in different ways under different circumstances. One crucial 
circumstance involves reward prediction; stimuli garner incentive salience 
to the extent that they drive goal-directed action (Robinson & Berridge, 
2001). We must recognize the important impact of Kapur’s perspicuous 
incentive salience theory of psychosis (Kapur, 2003), that delusions form 
as a consequence of aberrant incentive salience driven by an excess of 
dopamine in the ventral striatum. We note though that it was presaged 
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by more mechanistic theories grounded in associative learning theory 
(Gray et al., 1991; Miller, 1976), it did not readily explain the role of 
other neurotransmitters like glutamate and that the data on dopamine 
release capacity (Howes et al., 2009) have implicated the associative stri-
atum (not the ventral striatum) in the genesis of psychosis. Nevertheless, 
there do seem to be phenomenological and empirical data linking the 
broad category of salient events to delusions.
How do we reconcile salience and associative learning accounts with 
the phenomenology and neurobiology of psychosis? Bayesian models have 
been invoked to explain both associative learning and psychosis (Corlett, 
Frith & Fletcher, 2009; Corlett et al., 2010).
2.3  bAyesiAn Minds And bRAins
Thomas Bayes was a British clergyman and mathematician whose theorem 
was published posthumously. His is a theorem of conditional probabilities, 
of event A given event B, expressed as follows:
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Bayes may offer a way of bridging levels of explanation – from single neu-
rons, to groups of cells, to systems, and ultimately associative learning and 
belief (Clark, 2013).
Bayesian Brains Are Predictive Brains
Under this account of brain function, organisms have a brain to anticipate 
future situations, thus enabling survival by maximizing rewards and mini-
mizing punishments. This is achieved computationally by making predic-
tions and minimizing prediction errors through the hierarchical anatomy 
of the brain – wherein predictions are communicated in a top-down fash-
ion, from higher to lower layers. When predictions encounter bottom-up 
sensory information that does not match – prediction errors are generated 
which are either accommodated (ignored) or assimilated (incorporated 
into future predictions).
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Predictions originate in areas columns with less laminar differentiation 
(e.g. agranular cortex) and are propagated to areas with greater laminar 
differentiation (such as granular cortex). In the prototypical case, predic-
tion signals originate in the deep layers (primarily layer V) and terminate 
in the supragranular division of dysgranular and granular regions — prin-
cipally on dendrites in layer I, as well as on neurons in layers II and III.
Predictions then change the firing rates of neurons in layers I–III in 
anticipation of thalamic input. If the pattern of firing in a cortical column 
sufficiently anticipates the afferent thalamic input, there will be little or no 
prediction error. However, a mismatch will entail a prediction error. Some 
pyramidal neurons within a cortical column function as precision units 
that dynamically modify the gain on neurons that compute prediction 
error. Precision units modulate the weight of prediction errors on the basis 
of the relative confidence in the descending predictions compared to 
incoming sensory signals.
Chanes and Feldman Barrett applied this analysis more broadly to 
agranular cortices, notably to the limbic regions that regulate visceral con-
trol of the body’s internal milieu. Regions including the ACC, insula and 
thalamus may compute predictions and prediction errors and then other 
higher and lower cortical regions represent the specific domains being 
computed. We believe these sorts of models will guide prediction, infer-
ence and interpretation of neural data gathered during the formation and 
operation of beliefs. This arrangement may allow for the encapsulation of 
beliefs, without having to postulate a modular mental organization (see 
below).
The specific path the information takes is governed by the relative pre-
cision of the priors, as well as prediction errors (Adams et al., 2013). As 
Körding and Wolpert (2004) showed, the relative precision that governs 
how strongly we will rely on incoming data can be expressed as a linear 
function of priors and likelihood (probability of observing the data we see 
if the prior was true)1:
 E Posterior r Prior r Likelihoodreliance reliance( ) ∝ −( )∗ + ∗1  
1 We are assuming that both the distribution of priors and likelihood is Gaussian, with 
ε µ σprior priorN~ ,
2( )  and ε µ σlikelihood likelihoodN~ , 2( ) .
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If the pool of our priors is both large and heterogeneous, the incoming 
data will play an important role in influencing our prediction. But if our 
priors are precise it will have a negligible role in updating.
Dopamine, serotonin and acetylcholine may code the precision of pri-
ors and prediction errors in separate hierarchies (Marshall et al., 2016). 
For example, acetylcholine is involved in specifying the precision of per-
ceptual priors. However, stimulating dopamine neurons in the VTA, drives 
acetylcholine release in the nucleus basalis, which expands the cortical rep-
resentation of sensory stimuli that coincide with the stimulation (Bao, 
Chan, & Merzenich, 2001). This could be a mechanism through which 
salient events garner greater cortical representation.
The importance of the element of surprise in the learning process has 
long been appreciated. C. S. Pierce coined the term abduction as a key 
aspect of his explanation of inference. He dissociated abduction from 
other mechanisms of explanation like deduction and induction (Peirce, 
1931–58). Abductive inference has been used to help describe the genera-
tion of explanations for distorted perception culminating in delusions 
(Coltheart, Menzies, & Sutton, 2010).
Capgras syndrome is one of the most rare neurological delusions: 
(Capgras & Reboul-Lachaux, 1923). Here, an individual, sees his loved 
ones as imposters.
The confusion that accompanies living with this feeling of ongoing 
strangeness could become exhausting – a clear explanation, like “that’s 
actually not my wife”  – may be protective, although far from 
comforting.
Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1988) have discussed the explanation process as 
it might pertain to misconstrued experiences. They appealed to a number 
of heuristics and biases to which healthy people are susceptible discussed 
at length by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982).
Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1988) describe a man, walking down the street 
minding his own business, who suddenly and unexpectedly has an anoma-
lous experience  – he hears his name perhaps or perhaps a strange or 
unpleasant thought crosses his mind. All he knows is that something 
unusual just happened to him. The person then will initiate a search for 
the cause of an event; people seem to have a general propensity towards 
causal explanation (Michotte, 1963), and anomalous schema and incon-
gruent events demand such explanation.
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Bayesian Biases?
The Bayesian approach can be used to formalize several well-studied belief 
biases. For example, we know that providing people with counterargu-
ments that undermine their beliefs is not only insufficient, but it can also 
ironically enhance their confidence in these beliefs – just like the Seekers in 
the millennial cult.
The cognitive psychology of explanation involves conscious delibera-
tive processes; our models of delusions, perception, and learning are not 
committed to a requirement for conscious processing. While some asso-
ciative learning effects require subjects to be aware of contingencies 
(Shanks & Channon, 2002), there are examples of prediction error-driven 
learning about stimuli that were presented subliminally (Pessiglione et al., 
2008). Helmholtz considered perception to be a process of unconscious 
inference over alternate hypotheses about the causes of sensory stimula-
tion (von Helmholtz, 1878/1971). Fleminger applied this reasoning to 
misidentification delusions, arguing that misidentification of familiar per-
ceptual objects and scenes was due to a dysfunction in the pre-conscious 
specification of perceptual predictions (Fleminger, 1992) that would 
engender a prediction error demanding explanation.
Psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia are associated with resistance to 
perceptual illusions (Dima et  al., 2009). It seems that in patients with 
delusions, perceptual priors are more flexible and prone to change, and 
therefore less likely to affect perception. However, extra-perceptual priors, 
may be stronger. A team lead by Paul Fletcher (Teufel et al., 2015) recently 
showed that it is this extra perceptual knowledge sphere, where recent 
prior experience can change subsequent processing, which is hyper- 
engaged in individuals prone to schizophrenia and correlates with their 
symptom severity.
Perhaps most relevant to the present discussion is confirmation bias 
(Lord et al., 1979; Nickerson, 1998), through which prior beliefs bias cur-
rent decision-making. More specifically, contradictory data are ignored if 
they violate a cherished hypothesis. Prediction error-driven learning mod-
els have been generated that instantiate a confirmation bias. According to 
theoretical (Grossberg, 2000) and quantitative computational models 
(Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 2009), confirmation biases favor learning 
that conforms to beliefs through the top-down influence of the frontal 
cortex on striatal prediction error learning. DARPP-32 and DRD2 are 
two striatally enriched proteins. DARPP-32  – an intracellular signaling 
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nexus, DRD2 a key component of dopamine D2 receptors. Both proteins 
are involved in prediction error signaling (Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, 
Curran, & Hutchison, 2007; Heyser, Fienberg, Greengard, & Gold, 
2000) and involved in the top-down cancellation of striatal positive and 
negative prediction error signals that conflict with prior beliefs. Using a 
behavioral neurogenetic approach, Doll and colleagues (2009) found that 
genes for DARPP-32 and DRD2.
Of special interest to this discussion, confirmation bias is increased in 
individuals with delusions (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 
2013). Also, DARPP-32 has been implicated in the genetic risk for 
schizophrenia, the effects of psychotomimetic drugs (Svenningsson 
et  al., 2003), learning changes in instrumental contingencies (Heyser 
et al., 2000), as well as the functional and structural coupling between 
frontal cortex and striatum (Meyer-Lindenberg et  al., 2007). On the 
other hand, Doll and colleagues (2014) found that patients with chronic 
schizophrenia did not show an enhanced fronto-striatal confirmation 
bias. Furthermore, it is possible that confirmation biases are specific to 
delusion contents (encapsulated) rather than a general deficit (Balzan 
et al., 2013).
People attribute causal significance to the most salient perceptual ele-
ments co-occurring with the event to be explained (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). 
In the terms of associative theories, aberrant prediction error signals might 
randomly increase the attentional salience of aspects of the perceptual 
field, leading subjects to attribute inappropriate importance to irrelevant 
features of the environment (Beninger & Miller, 1998; Gray, 1993, 1998a, 
1998b; Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, & Smith, 1991; Hemsley, 1993, 
2005; Kapur, 2003, 2004; Kapur, Mizrahi, & Li, 2005; Miller, 1993).
People tend to jump to conclusions, employing short cuts and heuris-
tics. For example, people assume that the features of a causal event should 
resemble the features of its outcome. Unpleasant effects should have 
unpleasant causes. Furthermore, peoples’ causal judgments tend to be 
greatly influenced by their a priori theories about causation: If someone 
has the idea that many unpleasant events in the outside world reflect the 
activities of an international terrorist conspiracy, those same terrorists may 
be held responsible for unpleasant internal events as well. It seems possible 
to appeal to an associative mechanism to explain this heuristic, a particular 
personal bias may be mediated by associations; the increased salience of a 
particular out-group may increase the propensity to form associations 
between that group and events in the environment.
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The availability heuristic posits that the basis for judgment is the ease 
with which a plausible scenario can be constructed mentally. Judgments of 
causality are affected by the ease with which the person can imagine a path 
from a presumed cause to a known effect. When unpredicted events occur, 
the simulation process traces causal links back to prior causes. Consider a 
psychotic patient searching the environment for a likely cause of their 
anomalous experiences (Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988). Salient objects and 
events – a honk or a wave from a passing driver, perhaps a member of a 
minority group standing on a street corner – will inevitably draw attention 
and be given special weight as a likely cause of their troublesome internal 
events. If there is nothing perceptually salient, events may be retrieved 
from memory – a curse uttered in anger by a co-worker (Kihlstrom & 
Hoyt, 1988). If no suitable cause is generated through perception or 
memory, the simulation process may be invoked (Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 
1988). The person may imagine possible causes and grasp the first one 
that comes to mind as the most likely explanation (Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 
1988; Maher, 1974, 1988a, 1988b).
It is plausible that the simulation heuristic may be mediated by associa-
tive mechanisms, namely the retrieval of associative chains such that the 
individual can mentally trace the associations from outcome to cause. A 
probability tree-search mechanism mediated by prefrontal cortex may 
underpin this heuristic (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). Under the influence 
of aberrant subcortical prediction error signals, this mechanism may be 
invoked to account for the apparent relatedness of stimuli and events or 
the aberrant attentional salience of previously irrelevant background stim-
uli (Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1988).
While the heuristics described so far are involved in the initial genera-
tion of a causal explanation, anchoring and adjustment might be involved 
in the maintenance of delusional beliefs. Many judgments begin as hypoth-
eses  – tentative conclusions that can be revised on the basis of newly 
acquired evidence. However, it has long been appreciated that final judg-
ments are inordinately influenced by first impressions: The initial judg-
ment serves as an anchor for the final one, and there is very little subsequent 
adjustment. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic reflects a general ten-
dency to rely on initial or partial judgments, giving too little weight to 
newly acquired information. By virtue of its use, judgments of causality 
tend not to accommodate new information that should instigate revision. 
Instead, knowledge gained subsequent to the initial judgment may be dis-
torted so as to fit the original causal theory. Subjects thus adopt  suboptimal 
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verificationist strategies, seeking and paying special attention to informa-
tion that is consistent with their hypothesis (Snyder & Swann, 1978). As 
many researchers will attest, when confronted with evidence that counters 
a cherished belief, individuals often react by challenging the evidence 
(Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001). Once an 
explanation for odd perceptual and attentional phenomena is arrived at, 
the patient experiences relief from anxiety. The experience of insight relief 
diminishes the person’s subsequent motivation to question his or her orig-
inal conclusions and increases resistance to contrary information. This 
theme is represented in Miller’s (1993) associative learning based account 
of psychosis. He argues that arriving at a causal explanation that accounts 
for aberrant experiences is so rewarding/relieving that it is accompanied 
by a surge of dopamine (Miller, 1993). Dopamine also has impacts on the 
consolidation of memories (Dalley et al., 2005), and as such, an incorrect 
conclusion may be “stamped-in” to long-term memory by dopamine, ren-
dering it relatively impervious to disconfirmatory evidence.
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic may relate to another promi-
nent cognitive theory of delusional belief formation, the “jumping to con-
clusions bias” (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991; Hemsley & Garety, 
1986; Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). This bias was well-documented in 
healthy subjects (Asch, 1946; Kahneman, 2011), where individuals tend to 
make decisions hastily, and on the basis of little evidence. But the bulk of 
empirical evidence for this account comes from investigations of clinical 
patients’ performance on probabilistic reasoning tasks; typically, partici-
pants are presented with two jars holding colored beads in different pro-
portions. The jars are removed from view and subjects are presented with 
beads, drawn one at a time from a jar, and patients are then asked to predict 
which jar the beads are coming. Individuals with delusions tend to make a 
decision after only one bead (Fear & Healy, 1997; Garety et al., 1991; Huq 
et al., 1988; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). It is important to note that the 
bias is not specific to individuals with delusions (Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, 
McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006) and may represent a desire to end cognitive 
testing more rapidly or to avoid uncertain experiences (Moutoussis, Bentall, 
El-Deredy, & Dayan, 2011). Hence, this bias may also pertain to the 
defensive functions of beliefs (protecting against low self-esteem resulting 
from poor cognitive performance and the toxic effects of uncertainty).
The jumping to conclusions bias may represent a need for closure 
(McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006) in the face of aberrant prediction 
error signals that engender a stressful state of uncertainty about the world. 
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Recent behavioral and neuroimaging data suggest that as uncertainty 
increases, so do learning rates (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 
2008; Pearce & Hall, 1980). When non-delusional healthy subjects jump 
to conclusions (updating their beliefs extensively after one trial in condi-
tions of high uncertainty), there is hyper-connectivity between the ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex and hippocampus functional magnetic resonance 
signals (Lee, O’Doherty, & Shimojo, 2015).
Moritz and Woodward suggest that a liberal acceptance bias might 
account for apparent jumping to conclusions. When only two mutually 
exclusive options are available (as in the beads task), individuals rapidly 
accept that the beads are coming from a particular jar, but they do not 
decide that they are to the exclusion of other possibilities (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2005). This account allows for over-adjustment following 
contradictory evidence, since although they have strongly accepted one 
conclusion (the beads are from one jar), they do not exclude the alterna-
tive conclusion (that the beads are coming from the other jar).
When given more than two alternatives (for example in a thematic 
apperception task, where participants are shown pictures and asked to rate 
the plausibility of particular interpretations), psychotic patients entertain a 
broader range of possible interpretations (rating multiple alternatives as 
excellent or good interpretations of a particular scenario), whereas healthy 
participants are more cautious and effectively narrow down the set of pos-
sible alternatives. The broadening of plausible explanations may be a man-
ifestation of Miller’s inappropriate relatedness of entities (Miller, 1976, 
1993). And while it can undoubtedly minimize the rigidity with which 
one may hold on to an explanation, when new information arrives, at a 
higher, representational level, it may lead to the entertainment of implau-
sible or absurd accounts for a particular set of circumstances.
Since anomalous perceptual and attentional experiences may be 
unpleasant (Maher, 1974, 1988b), it is important to consider the biases 
that distort causal judgments about negatively valenced events. For exam-
ple, when humans make causal attributions, they tend to fall for benefac-
tance bias, such that they internalize the cause of positive events and 
externally attribute negatively valenced events (Greenwald, 1980; Kaney 
& Bentall, 1992). Such Lake Woebegone Effects – where everyone is smarter 
and more beautiful than average – are exaggerated in patients with para-
noia (Kaney & Bentall, 1992). Hence a psychotic individual seeking an 
explanation for their unpleasant anomalous experiences will most often 
look to the environment outside them, rather than say, to a dysfunction in 
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their own brain or body. These biases were the only types of belief afforded 
the status of adaptive misbeliefs by McKay and Dennett (2009). If these 
biases may be related to delusions, perhaps then, certain delusions could 
be adaptive misbeliefs.
In an fMRI study of the self-serving hindsight bias in healthy individu-
als, subjects silently read sentences describing positively and negatively 
valenced social events, then imagined the event happening to them, and 
finally decided the cause of the event, whether internal (was it something 
about you?) or external (was it something about your friend? was it some-
thing about the situation or circumstances?). Self-serving biased attribu-
tions (internal attribution of positive and external attribution of negative 
events) were associated with striatal activation (Blackwood et al., 2003), 
previously implicated in the motivational control of behavior (Robbins & 
Everitt, 1996), as well as in the mediation of delusions (Laruelle, Abi- 
Dargham, Gil, Kegeles, & Innis, 1999). Menon and colleagues (2011) 
showed that delusions of reference were associated with inappropriate 
striatal engagement during reading of sentences that were inappropriately 
judged to be self-related.
2.4  delusions, self And otheRs
Thus far, we have discussed beliefs in the context of individuals. However, 
they are constructed in a social context that involves interacting with oth-
ers and engaging with their perspectives. In our theory, the brain models 
incoming data and minimizes prediction error (Friston & Kiebel, 2009). 
However, it also actively samples those data, by performing actions on the 
world (e.g. moving through it) (Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 
2010). By predicting (and ignoring) the sensory consequences of our 
actions we also model ourselves as agents that exist. And, by identifying 
with the top layers of the hierarchy, the conscious experience of being that 
self emerges (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).
Passivity experiences – the sense that ones’ actions are under external 
control – may arise when the predictive modeling of one’s actions fails 
and the active sampling of sensory data becomes noisy (Stephan, Friston, 
& Frith, 2009). In such circumstances thoughts and actions that were 
self- generated are not attributed to self and, at the extremes, one no 
longer identifies with ones’ hierarchical model of the world. On the 
other hand, paranoia and referential delusions may be associated with 
excessive  responsibility, our sense of self extends to areas it should not. 
P. CORLETT
 49
Ketamine augments experience of the rubber hand illusion, the spurious 
sense of ownership of a prop-hand if the hand is stroked at the same time 
as one’s own hand (Morgan et al., 2011). People on ketamine get the 
illusion more strongly and they experience it even in a control condition 
when the real and rubber hands are stroked asynchronously (Morgan 
et  al., 2011). Patients with schizophrenia (Peled, Pressman, Geva, & 
Modai, 2003) and chronic ketamine abusers show the same excessive 
experience of the illusion, in the synchronous and asynchronous condi-
tions (Tang et  al., 2015). Activity in the right anterior insula cortex 
increases to the extent that individuals experience the illusion. Anil Seth 
and others have argued that the anterior insula is a key nexus for the PE 
driven inferences that guide perceptions of bodily ownership and agency 
(Palmer, Seth, & Hohwy, 2015; Seth, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 
2011). Others highlight the parietal cortex as a key locus for the illusion 
(Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005).
2.5  blAnkets, bRAins, beliefs
The “Markov blanket” might be one means a Bayesian brain distinguishes 
self and others (Friston & Frith, 2015). A Markov blanket it like a cell 
membrane. It shields the interior of the cell from direct exposure to the 
conditions outside it, but it contains sufficient information (in the form of 
actual and potential structures) for the cell to be influenced by and to 
influence those external conditions. The Markov blanket of “an animal” 
encloses the Markov blankets of “the organs,” which enclose the Markov 
blanket of “their cells,” which enclose the Markov blankets of “their 
nuclei,” etc. To distinguish such levels of hierarchies, Pearl used the terms 
“parents” and “children.” The Markov blanket for a node in a Bayesian 
network is the set of nodes composed of its parents, its children, and its 
children’s other parents. The Markov blanket of a node contains all the 
variables that shield the node from the rest of the network. This means 
that the Markov blanket of a node is the only knowledge required to pre-
dict the behavior of the node.
A Markov blanket separates states into internal and external. External 
states are hidden (insulated) from the internal states. In other words, from 
the node’s, or individual’s perspective, the external states can be seen only 
indirectly by the internal states, via the Markov blanket. The internal state 
models (learns and make inferences about) the external, lying on the other 
side of the blanket.
 DELUSIONS AND PREDICTION ERROR 
50 
Despite serving as a boundary, the Markov blanket may also have a 
role in synchronizing self with others. This occurs, for example, when we 
speak to another agent. In our predictive coding scheme, we adapt lan-
guage comprehension to the demands of any given communicative situ-
ation, estimating the precision of our prior beliefs at a given 
representational level and the reliability of new inputs to that level 
(Friston & Frith, 2015).
In a hermeneutic setting, though, Bayesian brains do not predict each 
other; they predict themselves provided those predictions are enacted. 
The enactment of sensory (proprioceptive) predictions is a tenet of 
active inference, as we can minimize prediction errors by actively sam-
pling data that conform to our predictions (Friston & Frith, 2015). This 
framework for communication is inherently embodied and enactive in 
nature.
The internal states (of each agent) and external states (their partner) – 
and the Markov blanket that separates them – possess something called a 
random dynamical attractor that mediates the synchrony (Friston, 
Sengupta, & Auletta, 2014). Through this attractor, the external and 
internal states track each other, or the states one agent occupies impose 
constraints on states the other can occupy. However, if the Markov blan-
ket or attractor become dysfunctional, first rank psychotic symptoms 
(Schneider, 1957) may result. That is, you may hear voices from recogniz-
able social agents that communicate with you, or believe that your 
thoughts, actions, and emotions have been inserted into your mind by 
others.
Of particular relevance is the implication of temporoparietal junction in 
hearing voices. According to Saxe, this is a central role in representing 
others’ mental states through predictive coding (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 
2013). Stimulating temporoparietal junction induces a “sensed presence.” 
Taken together with theories that suggest that hallucinations and delu-
sions arise when reality monitoring (or more accurately reality filtering) 
fails such that inner speech is confused with external speech (Johnson & 
Raye, 1981), one can see how perturbations of these inferential mecha-
nisms could render inner speech experienced as the communicative intent 
of an external agent. Similarly, Fernyhough, after Vygotsky, argues that 
children learn language through interaction with others; this begins out 
loud and later when we internalize speech as thought aberrations of this 
process subtend an inner voice that does not belong and is rather another 
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agent (Jones & Fernyhough, 2007). Predictive social models may also be 
set awry by poor attachment (Fineberg, Steinfeld, Brewer, & Corlett, 
2014).
2.6  theRAPeutiC iMPliCAtions
Predictive coding seems to entail learning about different contingencies: 
low-level contingencies, detected within a perceptual module (e.g. V1 or 
A1) and higher-level contingencies that involve integrating across time, 
space, and sensory modalities. When low-level contingency detection fails, 
higher-level, top-down knowledge-based contingency detection compen-
sates – hence a stronger reliance on high-level priors as Teufel et al. (2015) 
observed in people at risk for psychosis. To reinforce this idea, we point to 
a phenomenon from social psychology  – lack of personal control. 
Remembering a time in one’s life when one lacked control, such as prepar-
ing to skydive from an airplane, triggers a compensatory increase in illu-
sory pattern perception like superstitious behavior and belief in conspiracy 
theories; there needn’t necessarily be a direct connection between uncer-
tainty and the way in which it is compensated (Proulx, Inzlicht, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2012), as any belief will do. Ultimately, this conception of 
belief underlines our aversion to uncertainty and our preference for rea-
sons and explanations.
Why beliefs backfire in response to challenges is not yet fully under-
stood, however, there are models of the political polarization of beliefs in 
response to the same evidence that suggest the strength of priors are 
important. If priors are strong, polarizing effects are more likely. Personally 
relevant priors that contribute to self-identity are likely to be the strongest. 
This is not encouraging with regard to efforts to change strong beliefs.
However, there are some encouraging new data. One promising line 
of inquiry, with respect to vaccine beliefs, is the involvement of individu-
als who used to object to vaccines and have now changed their minds in 
engaging with others who are against vaccinations (Brendan Nyhan, per-
sonal communication). Many researchers agree delusions and beliefs are 
often grounded in personal experiences. To the credulous, personal expe-
riences are a reliable source. Relinquishing those beliefs on the basis of 
others’ testimony is strongly related to the credibility of the source 
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2013); for example, do the individuals trying to change 
another’s mind have a vested reason to disagree, like professional status, 
roles, or affiliations? Perhaps large-scale anti-stigma educational activities 
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in mental health have failed because they did not employ individuals with 
lived experience to spread the word about mental illness (Corrigan, 
2012). With regard to fixed and distressing delusional beliefs, perhaps 
peer- support might supplement our standard approaches to mollifying 
delusions. People with lived experience who have recovered from delu-
sions or learned how to manage them might be better at helping their 
peers experiencing ongoing delusions. More direct methods might 
involve hearing the story and imagining the position of someone directly 
affected by the belief. This technique was tested for beliefs about trans-
gendered individuals with success (Broockman & Kalla, 2016). With 
regards to the putative circuit, perhaps engaging empathy in this manner 
permits assimilation and belief updating rather than the discarding of 
prediction error.
2.7  WhAt shAPe is the Mind?
There are of course other theories of beliefs and delusions. Extant cogni-
tive neuropsychiatric (Halligan & David, 2001) explanations of delusions 
range from single factor (Maher, 1974), to two-factor to interactionist. 
The single factor account appeals to a deficit in perception; the delusion 
formation process being a logical consequence of such an unsettling expe-
rience (Maher, 1974, 1988a). Two-factor theorists appeal to a deficit in 
familiarity processing with an additional dysfunction in belief evaluation 
such that the unlikely explanation (“My loved one has been replaced”) is 
favored (Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2007; Mendoza, 
1978).
Two-factor theory is attractive in its simplicity. It derives from cogni-
tive neuropsychology; the consideration of patients who develop delu-
sions following brain damage (Coltheart, 2010; Coltheart & Davies, 
2000; Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2010). It holds that two factors are 
necessary for delusions; a perceptual dysfunction and a belief evaluation 
dysfunction. Each is attributable to separate locations of brain damage – 
for Capgras delusion the perceptual dysfunction may involve ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex damage that renders familiar faces unfamiliar. 
However, people with this damage do not always have Capgras (Tranel & 
Damasio, 1985). Coltheart and others posit that a further deficit in belief 
evaluation is necessary for the delusion. They suggest right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex may be the locus of the second factor (Coltheart, 2010; 
Coltheart & Davies, 2000; Coltheart, Langdon, et al., 2010). The logic 
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here is flawed; a second factor is only suggested. It would be necessitated 
by a double dissociation of functions (Coltheart, 2002). The data here are 
still consistent with a single factor: The ventromedial perceptual dysfunc-
tion could occur to a greater or lesser degree, delusions could arise in 
those patients who have more extensive damage and they may be absent 
in people with less extensive damage. Nevertheless, two factor theories 
emphasized the role of perception and belief in the genesis of psychotic 
symptoms. Updated versions of the theory implicated Bayesian mecha-
nisms of belief evaluation in delusion formation (Coltheart, Menzies, 
et  al., 2010) and interactive models suggest that perception and belief 
intersect in a Bayesian manner that may become deranged when delusions 
form (Young, 2008). This update moves two-factor theory nearer to PE 
theory.
However, PE theory challenges the strict distinction between percep-
tion and belief, and therefore the necessity for two factors to explain delu-
sions (Powers, Kelley, & Corlett 2016). The disagreement is not about 
delusions per se, but rather cognitive neuropsychology more broadly, the 
shape of the mind, the allowable relationships between processes and how 
one ought to relate the mind with the brain. These may seem arcane. 
However, we try to explain delusions to better treat them. Understanding 
their component cognitive and neural mechanisms is essential.
Modularity Versus Penetrability
In The Modularity of Mind (1983), Fodor sketched a mental architecture 
comprised of modules—systems that process a single specific kind of infor-
mation (Fodor, 1983). 2-factor theory demands this encapsulated modu-
larity. Belief and perception are separate and can be damaged independently. 
Information flows from perception to belief and never in the opposite 
direction (Fotopoulou, 2014). An encapsulated perceptual system, kept 
separate from the influence of beliefs, could keep our beliefs grounded in 
the truth offered by our senses (Quine & Quine, 1951). However, a cog-
nitively penetrable perceptual apparatus, per PE theory, may be equally 
adaptive, despite misperceiving and misbelieving (Johnson & Fowler, 
2011; McKay & Dennett, 2009). We perceive what would need to be 
present in order for our sensations to make sense, not necessarily what is 
actually there (von Helmholtz, 1867; Hume, 1900). Predictive percep-
tion is penetrated by beliefs to the extent this minimizes overall long-term 
PE (Lupyan & Clark, 2015).
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Ultimately, the two explanations (two-factor and predictive processing) 
are cast at different explanatory levels. Two-factor theory is concerned 
with describing cognitive architectures. Predictive processing aims to 
unite brain, behavioral and phenomenological data for all delusions (neu-
rological and those that occur in schizophrenia) as well as other psychotic 
symptoms like hallucinations and a-motivation.
2.8  ConClusion
A better understanding of delusions may be achieved by taking a reduc-
tionist approach to beliefs, conceiving of them as learned associations 
between representations that govern perception (both internal and exter-
nal) and action. Central to the process of associative belief formation is 
PE; the mismatch between prior expectation and current circumstances. 
Depending on the precision (or inverse variance) of the PE (relative to the 
prior), it may drive new learning – updating of the belief, or it may be 
disregarded. We have argued that this process of PE signaling and accom-
modation/assimilation may be awry in people with psychotic illnesses. In 
particular, we believe delusions form when PE is signaled inappropriately 
with high precision, such that it garners new and aberrant learning. We 
have described animal research that has furnished a mechanistic under-
standing of PE signaling in terms of underlying neurobiology; glutamater-
gic mechanisms underlie the specification of PE (NMDA receptors signal 
top-down expectancies, AMPA the feedforward error signal), and, depend-
ing on the specific hierarchy, slower neuromodulators (like dopamine, ace-
tylcholine, serotonin, noradrenaline and oxytocin) signal precision of 
priors and PE. There are thus many routes through which PE can be aber-
rantly signaled and many heterogeneous consequences of aberrant PE. The 
inferences that are perturbed give rise to the specific contents of delusions 
(they are about other people and one’s relationships to them, because 
these are the hardest inferences to make). We have described how such 
error correcting inferential mechanisms might give rise to the sense of 
bodily agency (the sense of being a self) and to a sense of reality more 
broadly. Disrupting these senses is profoundly distressing and results in 
psychosis. Armed with an understanding of exactly how people with delu-
sions fare on these tasks and exactly which neural mechanisms underpin 
them, we will be much better placed to determine the pathophysiology 
underpinning delusions and to tailor treatment approaches aimed at that 
pathophysiology.
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CHAPTER 3
Delusions and Other Beliefs
Richard P. Bentall
Abstract The difficulty of distinguishing between delusions and non- 
pathological beliefs has taxed some of the greatest minds in psychiatry. 
This chapter argues that this question cannot be resolved without first 
having an understanding of what is involved in holding an ordinary belief. 
Although we should not assume that ordinary-language words such as 
‘belief’ will correspond with a specific psychological mechanism or pro-
cess, sufficient evidence is available from diverse areas of psychology to 
reach some conclusions about what happens when someone ‘believes’ 
something. Beliefs are propositions about the world that are generated 
dynamically, often during interactions with other people, and therefore 
depend on the human capacity for language. Although many beliefs are 
mundane, it is possible to identify a class of master interpretive systems 
that includes political ideologies and religious belief systems, which are 
highly resistant to challenge and capable of generating considerable emo-
tion. These systems seem to depend not only on the ability to generate 
propositions about the world but also on implicit cognitive processes that 
are related to fundamental biological and social needs, for example the 
need to avoid contagion, the need to form close intimate relationships or 
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the need to avoid out-groups. Delusions share many of the properties of 
master interpretive systems but differ because they are idiosyncratic. They 
may arise when individuals are very isolated or if they lack the cognitive 
tools to function effectively in groups. Further progress in understanding 
delusions is likely to be made if research is informed by findings from 
political psychology and the psychology of religion.
Keywords Delusion • Belief • Belief systems • Political ideologies 
• Master interpretive systems • Psychology of religion • Political 
psychology
3.1  IntroductIon
Delusions, described in the latest edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (2013) diagnostic manual as, “fixed beliefs that are not ame-
nable to change in light of conflicting evidence”, are a commonly recorded 
symptom of severe mental illness, observed in patients with a wide range 
of diagnoses including schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar dis-
order and major depression. In recent years, paranoid (persecutory) beliefs 
in particular have been the subject of extensive psychological investiga-
tion, leading to well-developed psychological models and a rich experi-
mental literature (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 
2001; Freeman, 2016). However, both standard psychiatric accounts and 
psychological approaches have treated delusions as sui generis. At the same 
time, within the philosophical literature, there has been a vigorous debate 
about the doxastic nature of delusions – whether they can be said to be 
beliefs at all (Bortolotti, 2018).
Arguably, these developments reflect lack of clarity about the concept of 
belief. It is difficult to overstate how widely this concept is employed in 
clinical psychology (e.g. in cognitive models of depression; Beck, 1987), 
social psychology (e.g. models of social reasoning such as attribution the-
ory; Weiner, 2008), and cognitive science (e.g. models of semantic knowl-
edge; Martin, 2009). Within the social sciences such as sociology, political 
science, anthropology and history, the concept is so ubiquitous that docu-
menting its usage would be a near-impossible task. Indeed, some philoso-
phers have attempted to draw a distinction between the human and natural 
sciences on the grounds that human behaviour is rule-governed,  determined 
by reasons and hence (implicitly at least) belief-driven (Winch, 1958).
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In this essay, I will argue that, despite the absence of an over-arching 
theory of what is involved when someone believes something, sufficient 
evidence can be gleaned from diverse areas of psychology to reach some 
important conclusions and, furthermore, that these conclusions illuminate 
both similarities and differences between the delusions of psychiatric 
patients and the beliefs of ordinary people. The spirit behind this analysis, 
which is contrary to the standard psychiatric approach, involves starting 
with the assumption that delusional and non-delusional beliefs are similar 
phenomena until proven otherwise.
3.2  delusIons
Throughout the history of psychiatry the assumption that delusions and 
ordinary beliefs and attitudes are different has been coupled with the rec-
ognition that it is difficult to state exactly where the difference lies. This 
difficulty has practical implications, particularly for psychiatric diagnosti-
cians and in legal contexts when efforts are made to determine the culpa-
bility of people who commit serious crimes. The cases of Ron and Dan 
Lafferty in the United States (Krakauer, 2003) and Anders Breivik in 
Norway (Melle, 2013) illustrate this problem. The Lafferty brothers, 
devout Mormon fundamentalists, were convicted of murdering their sister 
in law and her infant daughter in 1983, apparently at the instigation of 
messages received from Jesus Christ; one of the brothers later proclaimed 
himself to be the prophet Elijah. Breivik committed a bombing and a mass 
shooting in Norway in 2011, killing seventy-seven mostly young people, 
apparently believing himself to be a member of a mysterious group, the 
Knight Templars, defending Europe against Islamist influences. In both 
cases, there was extensive debate amongst mental health professionals 
about whether the beliefs motivating the crimes could be said to be delu-
sional and therefore evidence of mental illness. Although, in both cases, 
juries ultimately decided that the perpetrators were culpable for their 
crimes, it was striking that mental health professionals continued to be 
divided on the issue even after convictions had been obtained.
Phenomenological data has often been appealed to when attempting to 
distinguish between delusional and non-delusional beliefs and, indeed, the 
failure of mental health professionals to reach a definitive position on the 
Breivik case has been attributed to the failure to attend to this kind of 
evidence (Parnas, 2013). In his celebrated analysis of the problem, Karl 
Jaspers (1913/1963) noted that delusional beliefs seemed bizarre to 
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others, are firmly held and are resistant to counter argument. However, he 
held that true delusions are distinguishable from ‘delusional-like ideas’ 
because they often occur suddenly and are “ununderstandable” in the 
sense that they cannot be understood in terms of the individual’s back-
ground experiences and personality. Later phenomenologists, such as 
Conrad, argued that delusions are the consequence of subtle changes in 
the way that the individual experiences the self and the world, and can 
therefore be identified by the emotional and perceptual changes that often 
preceded the development of the belief (Bovet & Parnas, 1993), a posi-
tion which is said to be supported by detailed analysis of patients’ experi-
ences (Parnas, Handest, Jansson, & Sæbye, 2005). A further observation 
that is said to call the doxastic nature of delusions into question is ‘double 
book keeping’ – the failure of patients to act in ways that are consistent 
with their delusional statements (Sass, 2014), a phenomenon that is said 
to show lack of normal commitment to beliefs, and which appears to place 
the patient in a position akin to solipsism (Sass, 1994). Notice that, in 
these analyses, a common sense concept of ‘belief’ is typically unanalysed 
and taken for granted.
It is possible to question the project to phenomenologically decon-
struct delusions on philosophical grounds. The phenomenological 
approach places great emphasis on patient’s ability to describe private 
experiences and yet, as the later Wittgenstein, (1953) and sophisticated 
‘radical’ behaviourists have pointed out (Skinner, 1945), reporting private 
events is a quite different type of activity to the reporting of public experi-
ences. This is because, during ontogeny, the acquisition of words to 
describe events requires that both the perceiver and others have access to 
the events in question (I can be taught by someone else to accurately name 
a “table” or corrected if I mistake it for a “chair”), a condition which is 
absent when talking about the inner world available to only one observer. 
Indeed, when examining historically important examples of delusional 
self-reports, notably the celebrated case of Daniel Schreber (1903/1955), 
the struggle to describe such experiences is palpable.
Empirical studies provide further grounds for questioning the criteria 
for delusions represented in both classification manuals and the phenom-
enological literature. First, delusions may be held less rigidly than often 
supposed, and conviction in them may be no greater than for other idio-
syncratic or religious beliefs and attitudes (Brett-Jones, Garety, & Hemsley, 
1987; Colbert, Peters, & Garety, 2010). Conversely, other kinds of beliefs, 
notoriously political beliefs, are often held very rigidly (Taber & Lodge, 
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2013), or shift in ways that seem to have very little to do with the rational 
appraisal of evidence (Achen & Bartels, 2016). Second, psychometric 
studies show that, in the case of paranoid beliefs in particular, the delu-
sions of psychiatric patients exist on a continuum with less severe ana-
logues experienced in everyday life (Bebbington et al., 2013; Elahi, Perez 
Algorta, Varese, McIntyre, & Bentall, 2017). Third, research with psychi-
atric patients and epidemiological samples has shown that abnormal beliefs 
are often preceded by life events that can be meaningfully linked to the 
beliefs. For example, paranoid beliefs are often preceded by severe disrup-
tions of early attachment relationships (Bentall, Wickham, Shevlin, & 
Varese, 2012; Sitko, Bentall, Shevlin, O’Sullivan, & Sellwood, 2014) and/
or experiences of victimization (Janssen et  al., 2003). It has also been 
pointed out that the phenomenon of double book-keeping may be much 
less ubiquitous in the lives of psychiatric patients than has sometimes been 
thought (so far as I am aware, no commentator on the Breivik case dis-
puted his delusional status on the grounds that he actually killed people) 
and can possibly be accounted for by supposing that the deluded person 
lacks the motivation to act on their beliefs (Bortolotti & Broome, 2012). 
Finally, anomalous perceptual experiences are often reported before the 
onset of at least one kind of belief that is widely accepted to be non- 
delusional, namely religious belief (Hardy, 1979).
Of course, none of these observations rule out the possibility that some 
of the beliefs expressed by psychiatric patients are qualitatively different 
from those of ordinary people. However, to see whether this is the case, 
we surely need to have some conception of what is involved when ordinary 
people express a belief.
3.3  What are BelIefs? the Inner lIst Idea
If the concept of delusion is slippery, the same is undoubtedly true of the 
concept of belief. A modern attempt to define the concept can be found 
in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Schwitzgebel, 2015):
Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term ‘belief’ 
to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be 
the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, need not 
involve actively reflecting on it: Of the vast number of things ordinary adults 
believe, only a few can be at the fore of the mind at any single time…. Many 
of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane: that we 
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have heads, that it’s the 21st century, that a coffee mug is on the desk. 
Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the 
mind.
When attempting to make sense of beliefs from a psychological per-
spective, it is important to acknowledge that everyday language may pro-
vide a poor taxonomy of human mental processes. Indeed, the English 
language provides many other concepts that appear to overlap with the 
concept of ‘belief’ to some degree, for example ‘attitude’ (the cognitive 
component of which can be thought of as, roughly, a belief about the 
value of something), and ‘prediction’ (roughly, a belief about what will 
happen in the future).
Some radical critics of folk psychology (the kind of psychological con-
cepts we employ in everyday life), for example eliminative philosophers 
such as Churchland (1986) and Stich (1996), have argued that we have no 
warrant to believe that folk psychological concepts such as belief will cor-
respond with discoverable psychological or neural processes at all, and that 
they therefore should be dispensed with in any scientific account of human 
behaviour. However, the fact that I have felt compelled to use the word 
‘belief’ to describe their position illustrates, I think, its fatal flaw.
I will therefore take the more pragmatic approach of identifying those 
mechanisms that seem to be involved when people behave in ways that we 
would describe as ‘believing’. (Much of what I will say will also apply to 
what human beings do when they are said to have an attitude towards 
something, or to predict something.) Before proceeding, however, it will 
first be useful to dispense with a common misconception about beliefs 
which, I think, lies behind the objections made by eliminativists (who, on 
looking in the brain see nothing that seems to correspond to the concept 
of ‘belief’) and certain types of methodological behaviourists (for exam-
ple, Watson, 1924) who object to talking about private psychological phe-
nomena on the grounds that they are unobservable.
The earliest references to belief in the English language all occur within 
a theological context. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary attri-
butes the first recorded use of the mental conviction form of ‘belief’ as the 
Middle English “Ðesne laf we æteð þonne we mid bileafan gað to halige 
husle ure hælendes lichame” (“This bread we eat when we with faith go to 
the holy Eucharist of Our Lord’s body”), which appears in Ælfric’s Homily 
on Nativity of Christ, written in about 1175. Of course, it is entirely pos-
sible that this early association between belief and religion simply reflects 
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the fact that nearly all of the earliest English-language texts were written 
by monks, but it is more likely because the creation of theological doctrine 
implies the need for a list-like approach in which beliefs can be codified 
and decisions can be made about who is a true believer and who is not. 
Indeed, in the face of competition between different Christian cults in the 
first millennium, the necessity arose to make people accountable for their 
beliefs, and so the early Church devoted considerable energy towards the 
development of checklists of beliefs, known as creeds (MacCulloch, 2009).
Speculating somewhat, the invention of creeds was perhaps the cultural 
origin a pervasive conception of beliefs as a kind of inner list that can be 
read out when an individual is interrogated (and which the individual may 
decide not to report accurately, in which case he or she is said to lie). It is 
not difficult to see why the inner list conception is problematic. We are 
capable of believing some things completely de novo (I believe that there 
are no convenience stores on the far side of Jupiter but I have never had 
this thought before today). Just as importantly, during everyday conversa-
tions, especially arguments and debates, what we assert to be the case 
(what we believe) may evolve as a conversation progresses; indeed, in 
many cases the establishment of what is factually the case occurs socially, 
through interactions with other people (Edwards & Potter, 1992). This 
kind of online elaboration, in which claims about what is the case are con-
structed and defended using various rhetorical strategies, so that what is 
true might be said to be negotiated, is not only observed during political 
debates and family arguments but also when psychiatric patients are chal-
lenged (Georgaca, 2000) and has a number of important implications.
The most important theoretical implication is that we should think of 
believing as a kind of activity or behaviour that evolves over time. Believing 
is something that we do, and therefore more like a performance than a 
script. Because believing is a dynamic process, there can be no final account 
of what we believe. To borrow a metaphor from Dennett (1991) our 
beliefs therefore appear as an endless series of multiple drafts, each one to 
be replaced by a further draft. Rather than thinking about beliefs (noun) 
we would better think about believing (verb).
A practical implication is that we should recognise that the way that 
believing is performed will vary according to circumstances, and that the 
spontaneous statement of a belief may involve very different processes to 
those involved in assenting to a belief presented by someone else. For this 
reason, simple questionnaire measures of beliefs have important limita-
tions. As a researcher who has used measures of this kind in numerous 
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studies, I hesitate to say that they have no value – clearly they do – but, 
when a person fills in a questionnaire, what they are really doing is stating 
how much they would be likely to agree with the beliefs of the question-
naire designer, which is quite a different thing to actually generating a 
belief. (Recent – at the time of writing in early 2018 – research on the 
British public’s attitude towards leaving the European Union illustrates 
this point quite well. Whereas polling data seems to suggest that those 
who voted to leave have hardly changed their minds, focus groups in 
which people are encouraged to freely express their thoughts have revealed 
a substantial group of ‘leavers’ who, despite stating that they would prob-
ably vote to leave the EU again in the event of a second referendum, have 
serious doubts about the wisdom of doing so; Gaston, 2018).
3.4  do dogs BelIeve?
With the above caveats in mind, we can now move on to consider what 
kind of psychological mechanisms are involved when a person is said to 
believe something. A helpful starting point is to consider whether animals 
believe. It is self-evidently true that the reader’s dog is unlikely to become 
a jihadi, but he will come downstairs at the appropriate time, stand in front 
of the cupboard containing his food and wag his tail hopefully. Can the 
dog be said to believe that the food is in the cabinet?
A rich tradition of empirical research, beginning in the behaviourist era 
but extending to the present day, has explored the intellectual capabilities 
of animals by investigating their ability to learn in various experimental 
situations. Much of this research has focused on either Pavlovian condi-
tioning in which the animal learns associations between previously unre-
lated stimuli (for example, that a bell signals the arrival of food) or operant 
conditioning in which the animal learns that certain responses are associ-
ated with rewarding or unrewarding consequences (for example, that 
pressing a lever is followed by the delivery of food). Interestingly, when 
nonhuman vertebrate species are tested appropriately, it is difficult to dis-
cern substantial differences between them – goldfish can be trained to per-
form tricks of surprising complexity if rewarded; it is just difficult to find 
ways of rewarding goldfish (McPhail, 1982).
There has been a decades long debate about whether the full complex-
ity of non-human mammalian behaviour can be accounted for by 
 associative mechanisms (Pearce, 2008). It is important to note that these 
mechanisms are capable of not only associating but also evaluating (when 
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a neutral stimulus is paired with a valued stimulus, the neutral stimulus 
acquires value) and anticipating (animals can use learned relationships 
between stimuli to predict future events). This latter property reveals that 
the associative system is much more sophisticated than was thought dur-
ing the early days of behaviourism. In a celebrated series of studies, Wagner 
and Rescorla (1972) showed that mere contiguity between stimuli is 
insufficient for conditioning to occur; stimuli are only attended to by ani-
mals if they carry information about other important events in their envi-
ronment. Hence, associative learning is a process that allows animals to 
predict the occurrence of evolutionarily salient events such as food or 
predators, and to select actions that either increase or decrease the likeli-
hood of encountering those events. If this ability were considered suffi-
cient to make an attribution of belief, then it would be reasonable to say 
that the dog believes that food is in the cupboard.
The ability that unambiguously separates human beings from other ani-
mal species is, of course, language. Many design features distinguish lan-
guage from naturally-occurring animal communication systems (Hockett, 
1959), but two particularly important ones are worth noting. First, the 
use of arbitrary symbols  – words  – allows human beings to talk about 
events that are not actually present (“black holes”) and with a high level of 
abstraction (“democracy”). Second, the structure of language allows these 
words to be combined according to syntactic rules, facilitating the con-
struction of propositions that incorporate complex conditional relations 
(for example, if-then rules as in, “If I don’t complete this chapter soon, 
Lisa will be very unhappy”). This latter feature is hard to account for in 
terms of associative processes. Four decades-worth of attempts to teach 
symbol manipulation and language-related skills to non-human animals 
have produced largely negative or at best inconclusive results (Lyn, 2012; 
Pepperberg, 2017). In particular, syntax appears to be denied to non- 
human species (Terrace, Petitto, Sanders, & Bever, 1979; Yang, 2013). 
Certainly, outside the confines of narrow experimental procedures con-
ducted within the animal laboratory, human being are the only species 
that spontaneously communicates with propositions, leading some to sug-
gest that we occupy a kingdom of our own within the taxonomic structure 
of the natural world (Wolfe, 2016).
Although the human ability to construct verbal propositions has clearly 
played a crucial role in facilitating the development of science and culture, 
language is not merely a vehicle for transmitting complex ideas between 
individuals and across generations. When we communicate with ourselves, 
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propositions provide a powerful tool for thinking. This idea was first 
developed by Pavlov (1941), who distinguished between what he termed 
the first signalling system (neural representation of the world) and the 
second signalling system (“speech … being the signal of the first signals”). 
In a passage that seems to have prescient relevance for the present discus-
sion, he cautioned that:
On the one hand, numerous speech stimulations have removed us from real-
ity, and we must always remember this in order not to distort our attitude to 
reality…. on the other hand, it is precisely speech which has made us human.
This idea was later turned into a developmental model by the Russian 
psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1962) whose seminal work, conducted in the 
1930s, only became known in the English-speaking world decades after 
his death. Vygotsky argued that, during early child development, social 
speech is acquired first, and noted a stage between about two and four 
years of age when children speak out loud even if no one appears to be 
listening, a phenomenon he termed private speech. Piaget (1926) had 
labelled the same phenomenon egocentric speech because he believed it 
was the consequence of the child’s failure to appreciate the absence of 
other people. Vygotsky’s view, which is now widely accepted by child psy-
chologists, was that private speech has a self-regulatory function and is 
addressed to the self. Private speech disappears later in development 
because it becomes internalized and silent, a phenomenon Vygotsky 
termed inner speech. There is not sufficient space here to detail more 
recent research on the role of language in thinking; suffice it to say that 
the ability to speak can fairly be described as a cognitive turbocharger that 
transforms human reasoning capacities and places us in a separate class to 
other species (see Fernyhough, 2016).
There has been some debate in the human experimental psychology 
literature about whether humans retain the associative system that governs 
animal behaviour. Although it seems unlikely that evolution would aban-
don a set of mechanisms that have proved so adaptive over millions of 
years, some experimental psychologists have argued that it is near impos-
sible to demonstrate animal-like conditioning in human adults and, there-
fore, that human reasoning is entirely propositional (Brewer, 1974; 
Mitchell, de Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). A problem faced when 
 attempting conditioning studies with human adults is that it is very diffi-
cult to contrive experiments in which the participants cannot readily 
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construct accurate propositional descriptions of the experimental setup. 
Hence, the research findings probably demonstrate the dominance of the 
propositional over the associative system when the relationships between 
stimuli are obvious. In other kinds of experiments (for example, when 
people attempt to learn complex rules about the permissible order of stim-
uli) associative learning appears to be more efficient (Reber, 1989).
In fact, over the past two decades a large volume of evidence from many 
strands of psychological research have suggested that human adults pos-
sess two learning mechanisms – one fast, intuitive, associative and shared 
with animals, the other slow, deliberative and propositional – leading to 
numerous proposals for two process accounts of human cognition (e.g. 
Evans, 2008; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Kahneman, 2012). When 
the associative system is dominant, we react in ways that seem automatic 
and ‘from the gut’, in which case our responses are said to be implicit. As 
we will see shortly, implicit processes appear to play an important role in 
some kinds of human belief systems.
An important feature of propositions is that they can be assigned truth- 
values. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition of belief given 
earlier implies that this is also a key feature of human beliefs – if we believe 
X we not only state X but also have the attitude that X is true. In fact, the 
English language (and I am sure all other languages) allows us to calibrate 
the likely accuracy of our assertions with a considerable degree of sophis-
tication (“I think that”, “I expect that,” “I hope that”, “I am sure that”, 
etc.). The psychological processes that allow us to calibrate our certainty 
when making statements about the world are not fully understood and 
well beyond the scope of this chapter, but obviously depend on a second 
order ability to reflect on the statements that we make. This ability falls 
within the general category of meta-representation, a process that appears 
to be restricted to the human species and which is undoubtedly closely 
linked to language, although the exact relationship continues to be a sub-
ject of lively debate (Sperber, 2000).
Crucially, the capacity for metarepresentation allows us not only to cali-
brate the certainty of our statements but also to designate beliefs as our 
beliefs – propositions that we take ownership of. Later, we will see that this 
concept of ownership probably helps to explain our resistance to changing 
our beliefs in the face of evidence that contradicts them. It also creates the 
opportunity for people to make judgments about what kinds of beliefs 
they should have, and to actively seek to cultivate particular beliefs. For 
example, an anthropological study of fundamentalist Christians in the 
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southern states of America found that converts often did not describe 
themselves as believers but as people who were seeking to believe, so that 
the acquisition of true religious belief was seen as the culmination of a 
long period of effort and learning (Luhrmann, 2012).
However well established the association between the cupboard door 
and food may be, it seems doubtful to me that a dog, as it waits to be fed, 
can be said to be asserting the truth of the statement that the food is in the 
cupboard. The dog certainly cannot express nuanced judgments about the 
likelihood of the cupboard-food association being true, nor assert a claim 
of ownership over the expectation that the food is in the cupboard. For 
this reason, I think it is reasonable to say that a dog cannot believe, at least 
in the full sense that a human being can believe.
3.5  Master InterpretIve systeMs
The Stanford Encyclopedia definition quoted earlier notes that many beliefs 
are quite mundane (the examples given are that “it is the 21st century” or 
that “there is a coffee cup on my desk”). However, it is equally obvious 
that some of the things we believe are far from mundane and are in fact 
loaded with significance. When understanding whether there is anything 
unique about the delusions of psychiatric patients, the appropriate com-
parison may be these more emotionally salient beliefs, and in particular a 
class of belief phenomena that I will term master interpretive systems: sys-
tems because they involve not just one proposition but an organized sys-
tem of generating propositions; interpretive because they reflect particular 
stances when interpreting the world; master because they tend to domi-
nate all other ways in which human beings interpret the social world.
This type of belief system, which includes religious and political beliefs, 
is not limited to particular propositions although it includes them (“God 
created the world in seven days”; “Everywhere workers are exploited by 
the ruling class”). Rather, master interpretive systems should be thought 
of as clusters or networks of inter-related propositions that address multi-
ple facets of human life and the dilemmas that arise within them. The 
propositions follow particular themes, for example, in the case of religion, 
that natural events are under the control of unseen intentional agents 
(Barrett & Keil, 1996; Bering, 2011) to whom we may be accountable to 
in an afterlife (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2015) or, in the case 
of political ideologies, about the just ordering of economic relations and 
the extent to which the interests of kin should be prioritised over those of 
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other groups (Haidt, 2013). Hence, the propositions within each network 
seem to orbit within the gravitational pull of more generalised dispositions 
towards the world that are rarely articulated and, therefore difficult to 
describe. Because these dispositions generate a repertoire of responses that 
can be called upon in almost any aspect of life, master interpretive systems 
are powerful organizational tools that can guide our actions in numerous 
situations and in the face of many different kinds of dilemmas, but at the 
cost of limiting human flexibility in exactly the way that Pavlov anticipated 
when describing the role of the second signalling system.
Religious belief systems, for example, provide models of the world and 
prescriptions for action (morality), coupled to a wide range of social prac-
tices which maintain these beliefs and which also have important social 
benefits (Geertz, 1966). The same is clearly true of political ideologies 
(Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009); indeed, for much of human history, 
religious and political belief systems have been entwined to the point of 
being almost indistinguishable, only diverging in Europe following the 
French Revolution, a process which some social scientists think is now 
going into reverse (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2009). Conspiracy theo-
ries, which have often played a role in both religious and political dis-
course (Hofstadter, 1952), arguably also fall within this general class of 
master interpretive systems. Indeed, because individuals who believe in 
one conspiracy theory tend also to believe in others (even if they are con-
tradictory; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012), psychological researchers 
have argued that conspiracist thinking cannot be to understood in terms 
of beliefs about specific conspiracies and should, instead, be considered a 
style of interpreting events in which nothing is assumed to be as it appears 
and world events are determined by secret, powerful institutions 
(Brotherton, 2015). The social element is perhaps less obvious than in the 
case of religious and political ideologies, although substantial social net-
works have arisen around some conspiracy theories (e.g. about the assas-
sination of John F. Kennedy) and the recent proliferation of these beliefs 
via social media has created on-line echo chambers populated by networks 
of individuals who share similar convictions (Del Vicario et al., 2016).
Human beings typically define ourselves in terms of the groups to 
which we belong, a process known as social identification (Tajfel, 1979; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). People are capable of 
having multiple identities simultaneously; for example, I define myself as a 
father, a clinical psychologist, a university professor, British and also 
European. As a consequence of the human ability to assert ownership of 
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beliefs, master interpretive systems are often co-opted for the purpose of 
identity-formation, so that we define ourselves as Marxists, Conservatives, 
Christians, Atheists and so on. Identifying with positively valued groups 
can enhance self-esteem and promote physical and mental health, an effect 
that is most evident when people identify with not one group but many 
(Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). However, identification can 
also lead to negative attitudes, sometimes extending to outright hostility 
directed towards competing out-groups, an effect that is most likely to 
occur if we embrace just one type of identity very strongly. This process 
appears to be one reason why religious and political fundamentalisms are 
sometimes associated with extreme violence (Herriot, 2007).
A curious feature of master interpretive systems, most clearly illustrated 
by political beliefs, is that the individual propositions that are their most 
visible manifestation may have little logical relation with each other. For 
example, the distinction between left and right ideologies (so described 
because, in the French National Assembly at the time of the Revolution, 
those who defended the Ancient Régime sat on the right whereas those 
who supported change sat on the left) seems to be universal (Jost et al., 
2009)  – conservatives on the right typically (although of course not 
always) endorse certain economic propositions (that the free market is the 
most just and effective way of organizing the economy) but also certain 
social values (support for the family, wariness or even hostility towards 
assigning equal rights for sexual minorities) and certain attitudes towards 
national defence (typically wanting high levels of funding for the armed 
forces). Leftists (again not invariably) support state interventions to redis-
tribute wealth, equal rights for sexual minorities and advocate multilateral 
efforts to reduce the risk of military conflict. Bearing in mind my earlier 
point about the limitations of questionnaires, perhaps we could say that 
people on the right and the left tend to generate propositions reflecting 
these viewpoints but, of course, the precise nature of the propositions (the 
draft we take to be the ‘true belief’) will vary between individuals (conser-
vatives may vary in their attitudes towards specific economic policies while 
agreeing about the broad benefits of a free market) and circumstances 
(someone on the left might advocate increased spending on the armed 
forces in support of peace enforcement missions).
Notice that there is no obvious reason why someone who advocates the 
free market should also be wary about gay rights or want to increase 
 funding for the armed forces. What binds the relevant propositions must 
therefore be less visible, which is why we can be confident that master 
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interpretive systems are organized around more generalised dispositions 
towards the world. Characterising these dispositions is, however, extremely 
difficult.
The Role of Implicit Processes in Master Interpretive Systems
Social psychologists, in particular, have made a number of attempts to 
classify the implicit processes underlying political and religious beliefs, for 
example arguing that they are related to a number of evolutionarily salient 
concerns such as the fear of death (Solomon et al., 2015), avoidance of 
uncertainty (Jost et al., 2009), or moral preferences relating to the care of 
others, fairness, loyalty, sanctity and the avoidance of contagion (Haidt, 
2013). For each of these proposals, there is evidence that agreement with 
particular ideological and moral stances is associated with scores on rele-
vant questionnaire measures (for example, that conservativism correlates 
with endorsement of statements about the importance of loyalty and 
indicative of extreme sensitivity to disgusting stimuli). In some cases, there 
is also evidence that ‘priming’ (prompting people to think about the rel-
evant issues) produces shifts in the willingness to agree with particular 
viewpoints (for example, asking people to think about death tends make 
people endorse more extreme political views).
The problems with these accounts, it seems to me, is that they endeav-
our to capture within a verbal framework, processes that are largely non-
verbal (indeed, this is precisely why they are said to be implicit). We 
therefore have a long way to go before we can characterise these processes 
accurately. At this stage of our understanding, it seems likely (as acknowl-
edged by most existing accounts) that these processes have evolved to 
address fundamental biological and social needs common to at least all 
primate species, and that (as less often acknowledged) they are imple-
mented by the associative system. To understand this idea, we can look 
briefly at the subtle role of disgust sensitivity in political beliefs.
Recall that one property of the associative system is that it allows organ-
isms to assign positive or negative values to stimuli. It has long been 
known that mammalian species are evolutionarily prepared to learn disgust 
responses to noxious stimuli very quickly (a single pairing of a particular 
taste with a nausea-evoking stimulus can be sufficient to cause a life long 
aversion to whatever produced the taste; Garcia & Koelling, 1966). As 
already noted, numerous studies have shown that individuals who are 
more sensitive to disgust-related stimuli are more likely to be conservative 
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and hostile to out-groups (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). One pos-
sible explanation for this association is that, in our evolutionary past, the 
disgust response has kept us apart from strangers who might be carriers of 
infection. Disgust also seems to be involved in concerns about ‘purity’ and 
the rejection of sexual minorities (whose preferences may be described as 
“filthy”, “dirty” or, indeed, “disgusting”) (Haidt, 2013). Indeed, when 
conservatives talk about their opposition to gay rights, a visceral disgust 
response is often all too obvious. Hence disgust sensitivity appears to be 
one factor that binds conservative attitudes together.
Speculating somewhat, I think it likely that specific implicit preferences, 
sustained by the associative system, play a role in all master interpretive 
systems. Indeed, as I will explain below, this is true not only of common 
master interpretive systems such as religious and political beliefs but also 
of delusional beliefs.
3.6  resIstance to change
One of the most renown characteristics of delusions is their apparent resis-
tance to change. As I noted earlier, this resistance may not be as remark-
able as is often supposed (Brett-Jones et al., 1987; Colbert et al., 2010). 
Indeed, the cognitive behaviour therapy interventions that are now widely 
used to help patients with psychosis are specifically designed to reduce 
delusional conviction and are modestly effective in doing so (Turner, van 
der Gaag, Karyotaki, & Cuipers, 2014; Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 
2008). Hence, as I argued earlier, a mistaken impression of excessive delu-
sional rigidity may have arisen as a consequence of comparing the beliefs 
of psychiatric patients with mundane beliefs; political and religious belief 
systems, which I have argued are a better comparison, are notoriously 
inflexible – it is rare that a political argument ends with one protagonist 
thumping their forehead and saying, “Doh! How could I have been so 
stupid?”
There are broadly two ways of explaining this kind of inflexibility, 
although they are not mutually exclusive. The first type of explanation 
appeals to the structure of master interpretive systems. As discussed earlier, 
their most important feature is that they do not consist of isolated propo-
sitions but, instead, should be thought of as groups of continually updated 
and interconnected propositions held together by the gravitational pull of 
implicit dispositions. Refuting any one proposition within a system of this 
kind will, in all likelihood, leave the remaining propositions untouched. 
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Even if this is not the case, it may be less cognitively effortful and more 
adaptive to shore up a propositional system with additional propositions if 
that system has served the individual well in the past. For this reason, true 
believers may decide that, “God moves in mysterious ways” or that the 
absence of evidence of a conspiracy is evidence of a conspiracy so profound 
that it leaves no evidence. (An interesting and historically significant real 
world example of the latter kind of reasoning occurred during the Reagan 
era, in 1976, when a CIA assessment of Russian nuclear capability con-
cluded that they lacked an effective anti-ballistic missile system and, hence, 
that the Soviet government would not be able to survive a nuclear 
exchange. In response to the CIA’s assessment, hawks within the 
Pentagon – who wished to justify increasing the US’s nuclear arsenal – 
issued their own ‘Team B’ report, which concluded that the evidence pre-
sented by the CIA was so overwhelming and consistent that it could only 
be based on misinformation planted by Soviet agents (Rhodes, 2008)).
The second broad approach to explaining the rigidity of master inter-
pretive systems appeals to emotional processes. As already noted, these 
systems are notorious for their ability to elicit strong emotional responses. 
Experimental studies confirm the everyday observation that, when people 
are presented with evidence that conflicts with their political convictions, 
they typically experience strong negative affect (Nisbett, Cooper, & 
Garrett, 2015), and expend considerable cognitive resources to finding 
reasons for rejecting or reinterpreting the evidence (Taber & Lodge, 
2013; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Hamann, & Kilts, 2006). The negative 
emotional consequences of encountering evidence that conflicts with pre- 
existing beliefs also helps to explain why, when seeking information about 
political issues (for example, when using online resources), people spend 
most of their time sampling information that is consistent with their beliefs 
while avoiding conflicting information (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 
2011).
The question of why evidence that is contrary to existing beliefs is expe-
rienced as emotionally toxic has not been sufficiently addressed by psy-
chologists. However, it is probably a consequence of our tendency to 
claim ownership of our beliefs, and the investment we make in construct-
ing them. Indeed, a recent experimental study found that establishing 
ownership of a theory in the most minimal way (by asking people to imag-
ine that they had personally proposed it) was sufficient to increase 
 confidence that the theory was correct (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 
2017).
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The more we claim ownership of a belief system, and the more we view 
our beliefs as badges of identity that bind us to others who share similar 
beliefs, the more likely it is that evidence contrary to our beliefs will be 
experienced as painful. When defending our beliefs, we are therefore, in 
some sense, defending ourselves.
3.7  delusIons as Master InterpretIve systeMs
Throughout this account I have pointed to various ways in which delu-
sions resemble master interpretive systems. Like master interpretive sys-
tems, delusions generally follow particular themes which almost invariably 
reflect universal existential challenges (Musalek, Berner, & Katschnig, 
1989) or concerns about the individual’s position relative to others in the 
social world (Bentall, 1994), for example about the trustworthiness of 
others (paranoia), social status (grandiosity) or worthiness of the love 
(erotomania). By far the most common of these delusional systems is the 
paranoid system, in which the individual believes him or herself to be the 
victim of persecution  by others (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2016). Of 
course, like other master interpretive systems, delusions are resistant 
(although not completely resistant) to counter-argument, and direct chal-
lenges to them often provoke strong negative affect.
Because paranoid delusions are so common, they have been subjected to 
more extensive research than any other types of delusional belief. Although 
there is insufficient space to review this research in detail here, a consistent 
finding in the literature is that these kinds of beliefs are associated with strong 
negative ideas about the self (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2016). However, 
by far the majority of studies of paranoia have focused on explicit cognitive 
processes such as self-esteem, and very little research has considered implicit 
processes. Here, I would like to suggest that, as seems to be the case for other 
master interpretive systems, implicit processes are also likely to be important. 
At this point it would be useful to consider some of my own most recent 
studies, which have examined the role of attachment processes in paranoia.
Since the work of John Bowlby (1969) it has been known that the inti-
mate relationships that young children (and the infants of other mammalian 
species) form with their parents (or caregivers) provide a template for future 
adult relationships. Hence, depending on the quality of the relationships 
they experienced with caregivers during childhood, human adults have 
‘attachment styles’ that may be secure (the assumption is that intimate rela-
tionships will be mutually supportive and beneficial) or, in various ways, 
insecure (the individual expects rejection or that other people will be 
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untrustworthy). It is thought that specific attachment styles are associated 
with particular schemas or default beliefs about the self and others, so that 
secure attachment is associated with positive beliefs about the self and others 
and the insecure styles are associated with negative beliefs about the self, 
others, or both. Importantly, although developmental researchers have 
neglected the role of implicit, associative processes in attachment formation, 
they undoubtedly play a central role. In adults, attachments are often expe-
rienced as ‘gut feelings’. Moreover, human infants form attachments very 
early  – before they become fully verbal human beings  – and non-verbal 
mammalian species are also capable of forming strong attachment relation-
ships. Indeed, although dogs will never become jihadis, they form remark-
ably strong attachments to their human owners that mirror the attachments 
that human infants form towards their parents (Topál, Miklósi, Csányi, & 
Dóka, 1998). Hence, it is clear that language skills are not necessary in order 
for attachment relationships to be established.
For practical reasons, attachment styles are typically assessed in adult 
humans by means of questionnaires, and it is important to bear in mind the 
limitations of these kinds of measures discussed earlier earlier; in particular, 
although we may hope that these measures correlate with implicit processes 
they are not direct measures of those processes. These limitations notwith-
standing, in my research I have found that insecure styles are strongly associ-
ated with paranoid beliefs in student samples (Pickering, Simpson, & 
Bentall, 2008), representative population samples (Sitko et al., 2014) and 
samples of psychiatric patients suffering from psychosis (Wickham, Sitko, & 
Bentall, 2015). Moreover, in epidemiological samples, attachment disrupt-
ing early life events, for example being neglected by parents or raised in a 
children’s home, strongly predict the development of paranoid symptoms in 
later life (Bentall et al., 2012; Shevlin, McAnee, Bentall, & Murphy, 2015). 
Hence, there seems to be strong evidence that the disruption of attachment 
processes plays a causal role in paranoid delusions and, most likely, the rel-
evant psychological mechanisms are at the implicit level.
Why Delusions Are Different: The Role of the Social1
Despite the important role of implicit dispositions in both widely held 
master interpretive systems and delusional beliefs, it is important to 
acknowledge that social factors are also important in shaping the precise 
1 I am grateful to Professor Tim Bayne for discussions that helped shape the ideas outlined 
in this section.
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expression of these belief systems, particularly in the case of the former. 
For example, if we take the case of religious belief systems, it is obvious 
that children are not born Hindu, Christian, Muslim and so on. 
Developmental studies have shown that, although young children typi-
cally attribute intentionality to natural phenomena, they do not spontane-
ously assume the existence of a hidden creator (Banerjee & Bloom, 2013). 
Indeed, given the historical evidence that multiple deities preceded mono-
theistic systems in the evolution of religions (Wright, 2009), if children 
did spontaneously generate religious beliefs those beliefs would surely not 
be monotheistic.
Similarly, although studies of the developmental antecedents of ideol-
ogy show that anxious children raised by authoritarian parents are espe-
cially likely to develop conservative attitudes in adulthood (Fraley, 
Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2012), it is implausible that children are 
born with an innate wish to vote for a particular political party. The 
social environment, conversations with relatives and peers, and exposure 
to information in the media all play an important role. Our implicit dis-
positions constrain the kinds of interpretations of the world we find most 
congenial or, to repeat a metaphor I used earlier, act as a kind of centre 
of gravity around which beliefs plucked from a rich social market place 
of ideas can orbit and coalesce.
The recognition that the social world must be important in shaping 
master interpretive systems alerts us to a potentially important feature of 
delusional beliefs that is not obvious from the phenomenological data, and 
which is sometimes thought of as trivial. Delusions, in contrast to political 
and religious beliefs, are idiosyncratic. Indeed, some definitions of delu-
sion, such as that in the earlier fourth edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s diagnostic manual (APA, 1994), specifically exclude beliefs 
that “are ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or 
subculture”. Even when patients appear to have the same delusions (as in 
the famous case of the three patients who believed that they were Christ 
and who lived on the same ward at Ypsilati Hospital in the United States; 
Rokeach, 1964) the delusion is not really shared (each of the Ypsilati 
patients thought that the other two were deluded).
Usually, the idiosyncrasy of delusions is thought to be a consequence of 
their bizarreness  – they seem so strange that no one but the deluded 
patient is convinced by them – but an intriguing possibility is that their 
asocial nature is both their defining feature and an important part of the 
causal pathway that leads to them. After all, in everyday life, we calibrate 
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our beliefs according to the beliefs and reactions of those around us. As 
discussed earlier, what we believe to be factually the case is negotiated 
through interactions with other people, within discussions, and across 
multiple conversations conducted over extended periods of time (Edwards 
& Potter, 1992).
In the case of extreme political and religious beliefs  – for example, 
Islamist extremism  – this account is widely accepted, and lies behind 
attempts by intelligence services and governments to disrupt radical social 
networks, both in the actual and virtual worlds. Political radicalisation, 
just like religious radicalisation, is particularly likely to occur when the 
only social network that an individual encounters, and the only conversa-
tions that are heard, are all of a particular persuasion. Indeed, social psy-
chological research confirms that people are more likely to develop 
extreme views when embedded in groups of like-minded people (Borum, 
2011; Sunstein, 2009). The role of social identity in consolidating extrem-
ist beliefs, discussed earlier, adds to the danger that they will be translated 
into violent action (Herriot, 2007).
What I am suggesting here is that delusional beliefs may be different 
from radical beliefs, and perceived to be idiosyncratic by others, precisely 
because they are developed in isolation from any kind of conversation, or 
any kind of group to which the individual can refer to. In the absence of 
these kinds of conversations, there is no opportunity for consensus build-
ing or for beliefs to be challenged or modified by contrary views. 
Speculating further, it seems likely that this kind of isolation can occur for 
one or both of two separate reasons.
First, the person who develops beliefs that are later judged to be delu-
sional may lack the cognitive and behavioural resources required to benefit 
from dialogue with other people. There are likely to be many psychologi-
cal processes that contribute to the process of building a shared view of the 
world but one that is worth highlighting here is the capacity to understand 
the beliefs of other people, misleadingly described as having a ‘theory of 
mind’ after a celebrated article by Premack & Woodruff (1978). Numerous 
studies have reported impaired theory of mind skills in people with psy-
chosis (Bora, Yucei, & Pantelis, 2009) with some evidence that this kind 
of impairment particularly contributes to paranoid delusions (Bentall 
et al., 2009).
Second, the individual may actually be isolated. There has been curi-
ously little research into the quality and quantity of relationships experi-
enced by people with psychosis, and that which has been carried out has 
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often been conducted on the assumption that mental illness leads to social 
isolation. However, it is known that patients with positive symptoms of 
psychosis have impoverished social networks (Angell & Test, 2002) and 
that the same is true of people who are suffering the prodromal symptoms 
(sometimes called an at-risk-mental-state) that precede the onset of illness 
(Robustelli, Newberry, Whisman, & Mittal, 2017). Isolation also seems to 
be associated with psychotic symptoms in the general population (Butter, 
Murphy, Shevlin, & Houston, 2017) and, in a longitudinal study of 
Swedish army recruits, impoverished interpersonal relationships was found 
to predict future psychotic illness (Malmberg, Lewis, David, & Allebeck, 
1998).
One important implication of these findings is that much more research 
needs to be conducted into the potential role of social isolation as a risk 
factor for psychosis and especially delusional beliefs.
3.8  conclusIon
In this chapter, I have attempted to create an account of what is involved 
when human beings have beliefs, and then explored the implications of 
this account for understanding delusions. It is worth restating that we 
have no warrant for assuming that the English language word ‘belief’ 
must pick out a specific type of psychological mechanism. Instead, I have 
tried to take what we know about human cognitive mechanisms to high-
light those that provide the closest fit with our ordinary language use of 
the word ‘belief’. This has led me to several conclusions.
First, there is no ultimate version or draft of what we believe that can be 
written down to make some kind of list. Instead, believing is something 
that we do online, in concert with other believers, a process that is con-
stantly shaped by our interactions with others in our social world.
Second, the term belief should be restricted to propositions or verbal 
statements; although there is a lot that is belief-like going on in household 
pets, it would be wrong to say that animals believe.
Third, this claim notwithstanding, implicit or associative processes that 
we share with animals play an important role in constraining and shaping 
our beliefs. These implicit processes play a particularly important role in a 
class of belief phenomena that I have called master interpretive systems, 
which includes religious and political beliefs. These consist not of single 
propositions but of multiple propositions tied together by particular implicit 
dispositions that are related to fundamental human needs. I have suggested 
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that the delusional beliefs of psychiatric patients are best compared to these 
master interpretive systems but differ from them in one important way: they 
occur in isolation and are not tested against the beliefs of other people.
Because delusions and master interpretive systems share many proper-
ties – particularly in respect to the underlying psychological processes and 
their resistance to change – it is reasonable to question the extent to which 
the two types of beliefs can be distinguished. Perhaps we should not be 
surprised by the troubles encountered when forensic practitioners attempt 
to make decisions about the culpability of apparently deluded offenders 
such as the Laffertys and Breivik. This is not to suggest that no differences 
can be discerned, of course, but that the distinction should not be thought 
of as binary.
More generally, I would like to suggest that psychopathologists might 
learn a lot by treating political and religious beliefs as analogues of the 
phenomena that they observe in the psychiatric clinic. It is striking that, to 
my knowledge, very little effort has been made by psychiatrists or clinical 
psychologists to consider the burgeoning literature in the psychology of 
religion or political psychology. It is even more remarkable that (despite 
the widespread use of the concept) there is no widely accepted psychologi-
cal model of believing of the kind that I have tried to sketch out in this 
chapter.
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4.1  Lessons from DeLusions
In recent years, the focus on delusions in the philosophical literature has 
contributed to dispel some myths about belief, making room for a more 
psychologically realistic picture of the mind. What do we know about 
delusions that can inform our understanding of how beliefs are adopted 
and maintained, and how they influence behaviour? What have philoso-
phers learnt from delusions? An entire volume could be dedicated to this 
issue alone, but in this chapter I will focus on three core philosophical 
claims about epistemically irrational beliefs that our knowledge of delu-
sions have successfully challenged.
First, our beliefs do not need to be epistemically rational to be used in 
the attempt to interpret our behaviour. The ascription of an epistemically 
irrational belief to us often contributes to the process of explaining and 
predicting what we do. Second, our beliefs do not need to be epistemically 
rational to have a positive impact on our psychological wellbeing or under-
standing. Sometimes, an epistemically irrational belief has some long- or 
short-term epistemic benefit because it shields us from anxiety or supports 
our sense of agency. Third, beliefs exhibiting the features of epistemic irra-
tionality exemplified by delusions are not infrequent, and they are not an 
exception. Optimistically biased beliefs about ourselves, for instance, may 
also be poorly supported by the evidence available to us, and resistant to 
the evidence that becomes available to us at a later stage. Yet, they are very 
common and widely regarded as adaptive. This suggests that epistemic 
irrationality cannot account for the pathological nature of delusions.
In discussions about interdisciplinary projects involving philosophers, it 
is not uncommon to identify the role of the philosopher with the concep-
tual tidying up and clarifying that are often deemed to be necessary in 
complex empirical investigations, or with the capacity to place a timely 
investigation within a wider historical context. By all means, such roles are 
important and philosophers are well placed to assist. However, as others 
have observed (e.g., Fulford, Stanghellini, & Broome, 2004), the role of 
the philosopher does not need to be so narrowly confined. Philosophers 
can also help develop a field in a certain direction, offering hypotheses to 
test and examining the wider implications of existing empirical results.
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In this chapter, I want to focus not on what philosophy can do for psy-
chology and psychiatry, but on what psychology and psychiatry have done 
for philosophy. As I hope to show, there are opportunities for philosophers 
who engage in interdisciplinary projects to learn something from the 
empirical and clinical sciences about the nature of those phenomena that 
have traditionally been at the centre of philosophical investigation. A care-
ful analysis of the results of focused empirical work on the relevant phe-
nomena, and attention to detail in the relevant case studies can reveal the 
inadequacy of established philosophical theories and suggest new ways of 
looking at things.
Here I provide an example of this. I argue that the study of delusions 
has contributed to challenging some widely accepted assumptions in the 
philosophy of mind concerning the relationship between epistemic ratio-
nality and belief.
Although definitions of delusions vary to some extent, most definitions 
are based on the surface features of the delusions, and identify delusions as 
epistemically irrational beliefs. Let’s see what it means for a delusion to be 
a belief that is epistemically irrational. First, what is a belief? Whereas our 
desire tells us how we would like things to be, our belief tells us how we 
take things to be. Thus, a belief is a mental state that purports to represent 
reality. If I believe that it rarely snows in London, I am committed to the 
truth of the claim that it rarely snows in London. Typically, our beliefs 
manifest in our verbal and non-verbal behaviour. For instance, I may 
decide that it is not a good idea to buy snow boots if I am going to spend 
most of the winter in London.
There are several distinct accounts of epistemic irrationality in the phil-
osophical literature, but the central idea is that epistemic irrationality con-
cerns the relationship between a belief and the evidence for it.1 The notion 
of epistemic irrationality I am going to work with for the purposes of this 
chapter is as follows: we are epistemically irrational when (1) we do not 
have evidence supporting our beliefs prior to adopting them; or (2) we are 
not responsive to evidence against our beliefs that becomes available to us 
after their adoption.
1 See for instance: “By epistemic rationality, I mean, roughly, the kind of rationality which 
one displays when one believes propositions that are strongly supported by one’s evidence 
and refrains from believing propositions that are improbable given one’s evidence” (Kelly, 
2003, p. 612).
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According to some of the most influential definitions in the clinical and 
empirical literature, delusions are epistemically irrational beliefs.2 One 
good example of this general trend is the definition we find in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The 
DSM-V says that delusions are “based on incorrect inference about exter-
nal reality that are firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else 
believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof 
or evidence to the contrary” (APA, 2013). The definition has been rightly 
criticised for the terminology it uses (Are all delusions based on inference? 
Can beliefs be proven to be false?) and for other good reasons (e.g., 
Coltheart, 2007, p. 1043), but it captures some aspects of the nature of 
delusions. In particular, both features of epistemic irrationality are present 
in the definition: delusions are ill-grounded and are not abandoned in the 
face of obvious proof or evidence against them.
If delusions are epistemically irrational beliefs, then they will share the 
characteristics typically attributed to epistemically irrational beliefs. But do 
they?
I will focus on three claims that are often regarded as safe assumptions 
about epistemically irrational beliefs in the philosophy of mind, and ask to 
what extent they are true of delusions. The first claim is that, due to our 
epistemically irrational beliefs, our behaviour is either impossible or diffi-
cult to understand, and other people’s attempts to interpret or predict our 
actions on the basis of our beliefs are destined to fail. The second claim is 
that our epistemically irrational beliefs have negative consequences for our 
psychological and epistemic status, by compromising both our wellbeing 
and our access to the truth, and thus they should be challenged by default. 
The third claim is that epistemically irrational beliefs are an anomaly to be 
explained away, an exception in our largely rational belief system. Indeed, 
it is only because epistemic irrationality is not widespread that we can have 
intentional agency at all.
I will argue in this chapter that the three claims about epistemically 
irrational beliefs are not compatible with what we know about delusions. 
Moreover, they are inaccurate and misleading when applied to a number 
2 See for instance: “A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief 
with a degree of firmness that is both utterly unwarranted by the evidence at hand, and that 
jeopardises their day-to-day functioning” (McKay et al., 2005, p. 315) and: “Delusions are 
generally accepted to be beliefs which (a) are held with great conviction; (b) defy rational 
counter-argument; and (c) would be dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same 
socio-cultural group” (Gilleen & David, 2005, pp. 5–6).
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of beliefs that are commonly regarded as epistemically irrational but are 
not delusional. In other words, they are either claims that must be quali-
fied, or myths that must be left behind.
In Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, I explain how the study of delusions shows not 
only that epistemically irrational beliefs can be understood, but that it is 
often via the attribution of those beliefs to us that our behaviour can be 
explained and predicted. Even so-called ‘bizarre delusions’ can be under-
stood in context and appealed to, both in the explanation of past behav-
iour and in the prediction of future behaviour. Thus, it is implausible to 
hold that epistemically irrational beliefs always or by necessity compromise 
interpretation.
In Sects. 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, I offer some reasons to qualify the claim that 
irrational beliefs have negative consequences from a psychological and 
epistemic point of view. In some cases, irrational beliefs can have signifi-
cant psychological and even epistemic benefits. In particular, delusional 
beliefs have some (obvious, long-term) costs and some (less obvious, 
shorter-term) benefits. Delusions appear not to be well-supported by evi-
dence, are resistant to counterevidence and counterargument, and can 
seriously disrupt functioning. Depending on their content, they can be a 
source of anxiety and distress. But they can also make a contribution to 
our sense of competence and coherence, and, in the critical situation in 
which they often emerge, they can even support our engagement with the 
surrounding physical and social environment after uncertainty, trauma, or 
abuse. Thus, as counter-intuitive as it may sound, in those circumstances 
it may be unwise to challenge delusions.
Although philosophers accept that some false and irrational beliefs can 
be useful in some contexts, they are very resistant to the idea that false and 
irrational beliefs might have some positive role to play from an epistemic 
point of view. Surely, false and irrational beliefs take us further from the 
truth. How can they contribute to the achievement of epistemic goals, 
such as the acquisition, retention, and use of relevant information? I will 
show that some false and irrational beliefs can play a positive epistemic 
function. In particular, some delusions serve as an emergency response to 
a break-down of epistemic functionality.
In Sect. 4.7, I challenge the claim that irrational beliefs are the excep-
tion to the rule, a relatively rare occurrence in our largely rational belief 
systems. Although clinically significant delusions are not widespread, 
beliefs sharing the same epistemic features as delusions, and thus falling 
short of standards of epistemic rationality, are common. Here I will refer 
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to positive illusions (Taylor, 1989) generating overly optimistic beliefs 
about ourselves that are not well-supported by evidence, are resistant to 
counterevidence, and often misrepresent reality. What distinguishes delu-
sions from optimistically biased beliefs and other epistemically irrational 
beliefs is an interesting question that has not been satisfactorily answered 
yet. But the discussion in this chapter will give us reason to believe that the 
source of the alleged pathological nature of delusions cannot be their epis-
temic irrationality.
In Sect. 4.8, I will examine the implications of dispelling the three 
myths of epistemically irrational belief discussed in the previous sections. 
How does the rejection of the assumptions surrounding epistemically irra-
tional beliefs affect what we know about the mind and how we view men-
tal health?
4.2  “irrationaL BeLiefs make interpretation 
impossiBLe”
If a man says that there is a full-scale nuclear reactor inside himself, or if a 
woman says that she is always pregnant and giving birth to a series of 
Messiahs, you may wonder whether they really mean what they say.3 That 
is because what these people say sounds not just implausible, but 
impossible.
On an influential view in philosophy of mind, rationality and under-
standing go hand in hand. More precisely, our behaviour can be inter-
preted, explained, and predicted in intentional terms, that is, by reference 
to our beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on, only if it meets some basic 
standards of rationality. The view is reflected in two influential approaches 
to interpretation, the so-called principle of charity (Davidson, 1980) and 
the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987).
If we are intelligibly to attribute attitudes and beliefs, or usefully to describe 
motions as behavior, then we are committed to finding, in the pattern of 
behavior, belief, and desire, a large degree of rationality and consistency. 
(Davidson, 1980, p. 237)
When we are not [rational], the cases defy description in ordinary terms of 
belief and desire. (Dennett, 1987, p. 87)
3 These examples are discussed in Bortolotti and Broome (2012).
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Although for Davidson and Dennett the demands of epistemic rational-
ity do not exhaust the rationality constraints on belief attribution, epis-
temic rationality plays a central role in the development of their views on 
belief and intentionality.
There are several versions of the idea that rationality and interpretation 
go together, some stronger (according to which it is impossible to interpret 
irrational behaviour) and other weaker (according to which it is especially 
difficult to interpret irrational behaviour). Here is one version of the idea 
that there is a rationality constraint on the ascription of beliefs:
Propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of a special 
sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to 
be, or to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be. (McDowell, 
1985, p. 389)
4.3  Bizarre DeLusions
So-called bizarre delusions seem to be the perfect illustration of the claim 
that irrationality compromises interpretation and understanding. In the 
DSM-V, delusions are described as bizarre “if they are clearly implausible 
and not understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from 
ordinary life experiences” (APA, 2013). ‘Bizarre’ delusions are epistemi-
cally irrational in that they are neither well-supported by the existing evi-
dence, nor responsive to new evidence; moreover, they are implausible, 
typically conflicting with other things we are committed to.4
Karl Jaspers (1963) describes some delusions (those delusions that 
involve a radical transformation of both experience and meaning) as un- 
understandable. The definition of delusions in the DSM-V (APA, 2013, 
p. 87) reflects this approach: bizarre delusions are an instance of irrational 
behaviour (“fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of con-
flicting evidence”) that cannot be interpreted (“clearly implausible and 
not understandable to same-culture peers”).
But the view that our behaviour cannot be interpreted in intentional 
terms unless the belief we seem to express is rational has unattractive 
4 See for instance: “Rationality is a normative constraint of consistency and coherence on 
the formation of a set of beliefs and thus is prima facie violated in two ways by the delusional 
subject. First she accepts a belief that is incoherent with the rest of her beliefs, and secondly 
she refuses to modify that belief in the face of fairly conclusive counterevidence and a set of 
background beliefs that contradict the delusional belief” (Gerrans, 2000, p. 114).
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 consequences. If we cannot be interpreted as believing what we say, and 
our behaviour cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of our reports, 
when they are taken literally, then what should our interpreters do?
They could attempt to rationalise what we say, that is, assume that we 
do not mean what we literally say. As a result, they could make an alterna-
tive attribution to us that no longer violates rationality constraints. They 
could make sense of the man reporting that he has a nuclear reactor inside 
himself by ‘correcting’ his report: “Maybe, what he means is that he feels 
like he has a reactor inside himself because he feels that there is something 
wrong with him.” The same strategy of rationalisation could be adopted 
in the case of the woman reporting that she has given birth to an endless 
series of Messiahs. “Maybe, what she means is that she is willing to give 
birth to an endless series of Messiahs if God asks her to, because she want 
to do God’s will.”
In cases of apparent irrationality, philosophers committed to there 
being a rationality constraint on belief ascription suggest that interpreters 
need to find a way to rationalise the report, to ‘correct the mistake’.5 The 
problem is that the rest of the behaviour of people with ‘bizarre’ delusions 
often makes sense only if their reports are taken at face value, literally, and 
not as metaphorical expressions of discomfort or desire. It is because the 
content of the delusion is believed, often with conviction, that it has such 
a significant, and often disruptive, impact on their lives.
The man who reported that he had a nuclear reactor inside himself was 
concerned about the presence of the nuclear reactor, and experienced frus-
tration when others did not believe him. The man would not have been as 
concerned if the presence of a reactor inside himself had just been a meta-
phor, and he would not have felt frustration at other people’s disbelief. 
The woman who reported that she had given birth to an endless series of 
Messiahs felt privileged about her condition (Bortolotti & Broome, 2012, 
p. 190). The woman would not have felt this way if she had just desired to 
give birth to Messiahs. It is because she believed that she had given birth 
to them that she felt privileged.
The strong feelings and persistent thoughts related to our ‘bizarre’ delu-
sions are easier to understand in the context of our believing (as opposed 
5 See for instance: “[…] when a mistake is agreed to have been made we will often look for, 
and find, a reason why it was made, not just in the sense of cause or regularity in its making 
but in the sense of some excuse which reconciles the mistake with the idea that, even in mak-
ing it, the perpetrator was exercising his or her rationality” (Heal, 1998, p. 99).
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to imagining or desiring) that we are in a very peculiar situation. And the 
content of the delusional beliefs may not appear as bizarre in the context of 
our experiences prior to the adoption of the delusional beliefs. In many 
circumstances delusions make sense. For instance, those who develop delu-
sions of persecution often have been abused or mistreated in their past and 
so their tendency to see other people as hostile can be easily explained in 
context (see Gunn & Bortolotti, 2018).
Some background knowledge about our significant life events com-
bined with attention to how we talk about our experiences can help the 
interpreter make sense of ‘bizarre’ delusions. This idea can be extended to 
a wider range of unusual beliefs. For instance, it is easier to understand 
why we claim to have been abducted by aliens if interpreters take into 
account our experiences and cultural background (see Bortolotti, Gunn, 
& Sullivan-Bissett, 2016). Experiences of ‘abduction’ can be caused by a 
phenomenon called ‘awareness during sleep paralysis’ (ASP) and by hyp-
nopompic hallucinations. During Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep, we 
are immobilized and can wake up before the paralysis has disappeared, 
realising that we are unable to move. Sleep paralysis can be accompanied 
by hypnopompic hallucinations, which means that we are also hallucinat-
ing sights and sounds. Faced with these experiences, we search for an 
explanation, and we may be inclined to believe that we have been abducted 
by aliens if we belong to a sub-culture where the idea of intelligent aliens 
coming in contact with humans is not ruled out.
4.4  “irrationaL BeLiefs are aLways BaD for us”
Delusional beliefs are a common example of irrationality but are also a 
perfect illustration of beliefs that can be harmful, generating distress, and 
severely disrupting our lives. Many of the people who come to the atten-
tion of healthcare professionals and are diagnosed with delusions do not 
sleep properly, experience social withdrawal, cannot keep their jobs or 
continue their studies, and cause concern to their families, employers, 
neighbours, sometimes even the police.
Although there are cases where some people feel at least temporarily 
empowered by or privileged about the content of their delusions (as the 
woman who thought she had given birth to an endless series of Messiahs), 
for the great majority of people delusions are a source of unhappiness. 
Thus, it is natural to link the epistemic irrationality of the delusions to 
their harmfulness. Isn’t it because they are so divorced from reality that 
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delusions end up affecting our lives so negatively? I hope to show here that 
the link between harmfulness and epistemic irrationality is tempting, but 
is ultimately an oversimplification.
I am going to offer some examples of delusions that are harmful, in that 
they generate clashes with reality that are a source of anxiety and distress, 
but also play a protective or defensive role, temporarily ameliorating a 
critical situation. Let’s start with the most obvious example, so-called 
motivated delusions (Bortolotti, 2015). How the delusions are described 
gives it away: these are beliefs that we may be motivated to hold on to, 
because they represent not the reality we find ourselves in, but a reality we 
would prefer to be in.
4.5  motivateD DeLusions
An example of a delusion with a defensive function is the case of Reverse 
Othello syndrome detailed in P.V. Butler and further discussed by Ryan 
McKay, Robyn Langdon, and Max Coltheart. BX was a talented musician 
who became quadriplegic after a tragic accident. He believed that he was 
still in a satisfying relationship, when in fact the woman who had been his 
partner had left him and started a relationship with someone else (McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005). BX’s belief in the fidelity of his former 
partner and the continued success of his relationship was very resistant to 
counterevidence. BX believed that his relationship was going well, even 
though his former partner refused to communicate with him (Butler, 
2000, p. 86).
The Reverse Othello syndrome can be seen as a special case of erotoma-
nia. In erotomania, we come to believe that another person, often of a 
perceived higher status, is in love with us when there is no clear evidence 
in support of that belief. Here is a more typical case of erotomania. LT was 
a young woman who became obsessed with the idea that a fellow student 
was in love with her although the two had never spoken to each other. She 
explained that the student would send her love messages and marriage 
proposals via the TV, the colours of dresses, and car licence plates (Jordan 
& Howe, 1980). Although the young man was asked to talk to LT on the 
phone, clarifying that he had no intention to marry her, LT remained 
convinced that he loved her, and came to believe that the man on the 
phone was another person.
In the cases of BX and LT, what are their delusions protecting them 
from? It is not easy to say, but one can speculate from the further details 
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provided in the case studies. Butler argues that for BX the appearance of 
the delusion “may mark an adaptive attempt to regain intrapsychic coher-
ence and to confer meaning on otherwise catastrophic loss or emptiness” 
(Butler, 2000, p. 90). BX did feel a sense of loss after the accident because 
he acquired a severe disability compromising his future aspirations. The 
belief that his relationship had not ended was both false and resistant to 
counterevidence, but gave him hope and strength at a critical time.
LT’s mother described her as quiet and lonely, and explained that one 
of her brief relationships had ended just before she started believing that 
her fellow student was in love with her. The break up had caused her sig-
nificant distress (Jordan & Howe, 1980, pp. 982–3). The belief that she 
was loved and desired might have protected LT from low mood, following 
a long history of low self-esteem and a recent, painful rejection.
The lesson from motivated delusions is that an epistemically irrational 
belief can prevent people who have experienced traumatic or emotionally 
distressing events from becoming depressed. As the belief enhances reality, 
in the short run it may be a psychologically adaptive response. By enabling 
us to continue to interact with the surrounding environment (albeit 
imperfectly), motivated delusions can also support our epistemic function-
ality, that is, our capacity to acquire, retain, and use relevant information. 
Along these lines, Butler and his team speculated that BX’s Reverse 
Othello syndrome supported his motivation to engage in rehabilitation, 
and noted that the delusion faded away soon after the rehabilitation pro-
gramme had ended.
The adoption of motivated delusions seems to provide some temporary 
relief from low mood and anxiety and thus protecting from lack of con-
centration, irritability, social isolation, and emotional disturbances. One 
might think that the case of motivated delusions is especially well suited to 
the purpose of showing that some epistemically irrational beliefs can be 
good for us. But it has been suggested that other types of delusions can 
also play an adaptive role, at least in the short term.
4.6  DeLusions in schizophrenia
Consider the following example, adapted from the one originally pre-
sented by Schneider in Clinical Psychopathology (1959). You are taking a 
walk in your hometown when you notice a dog on the steps of a Catholic 
church. While you pass the front of the church, the dog gets up on his 
hind legs. Then he moves his front paw forward. What do you make of 
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this? Probably nothing. But what if you felt that the dog’s action was 
meant for you? Maybe you would start thinking about other events involv-
ing churches that you witnessed recently. Maybe the previous encounters 
were also meant for you and led up to today’s event. Maybe the dog was 
trying to communicate something. Maybe he was delivering a message 
from God, revealing that you were chosen to carry out an important 
mission.
The hypothesis that the dog is a messenger from God is far-fetched, 
you can grant that. If one of your friends had come up with such a story 
you would not believe her, and so it is not a surprise for you if your friends 
do not believe you when you tell them. But you just know it is true. It 
explains everything. Knowing why the dog behaved as he did dissolves at 
last the anxiety and uncertainty that had become a constant feature of your 
everyday experiences: feeling that something important was about to hap-
pen, and the dread of not knowing what it was. When you realize that the 
dog is delivering a message from God, you feel relieved and empowered. 
God has found a secret and effective way to communicate with you.
Classical authors such as Karl Jaspers (Jaspers, 1963) and Klaus Conrad 
(Mishara, 2010), and contemporary authors such as Glen Roberts 
(Roberts, 1991, 2006), and Aaron Mishara and Phil Corlett (Mishara & 
Corlett, 2009), have argued that elaborated delusions in schizophrenia 
can be seen as either an emergency response or a revelation, putting an 
end to a situation of great uncertainty and anxiety. To start with, the adop-
tion of a delusional hypothesis may support epistemic functionality by fos-
tering a new attitude towards experience. We feel that it is in our power to 
understand what is going on in our lives. An interesting study (Bergstein, 
Weizman, & Solomon, 2008) has shown that people with elaborated 
delusions in the acute stage of psychosis have a strong sense of coherence, a 
psychological construct encompassing intellectual curiosity and a sense of 
self-efficacy and purpose.6 Arguably, such an attitude towards experience 
is more conducive to the acquisition and exchange of information than the 
state of passive, anxious uncertainty that characterizes the prodromal 
phase of psychosis.
6 The sense of coherence is defined as “a global orientation that expresses the extent to 
which one has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic, feeling of confidence that (1) the 
stimuli deriving from one’s internal and external environments are structured, predictable, 
and explicable; (2) the resources are available to one to meet the demands posed by these 
stimuli; and (3) these demands are challenges, worthy of investment and engagement” 
(Antonovsky, 1987, p. 91).
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Then, the adoption of the delusion may have positive effects on the 
habitual and automated processes that are conducive to learning. One 
common view about the adoption of delusional beliefs is that, in the pro-
dromal stage of psychosis, we experience random events as especially 
important to us and cannot understand why.7 Such experiences can 
become distressing and demand an explanation (such as, “God is using the 
dog to send me a message”). The delusion can be that explanation, 
enabling us to overcome uncertainty and making sense of what goes on 
around us.8
Thus, it has been argued that some delusions are adaptive not only 
psychologically, by temporarily reducing anxiety, but also in other ways 
(Mishara & Corlett, 2009). The suggestion is that delusions allow us to 
keep in touch with our environment. This claim can be explained by 
 reference to how delusions are adopted. In one influential hypothesis 
about delusion formation, during the prodromal stage of psychosis, 
prediction- error signals are produced when there is no real mismatch 
between prediction and actual inputs. We feel that something significant is 
happening because our experience does not match our predictions. When 
this happens, our internal model of the world is thought to be incorrect 
and undergoes revision. As a result of excessive prediction-error signals, 
automated and habitual learning is compromised and conscious and con-
trolled processes take over instead.
When the delusion is formed, not only does it put an end to over-
whelming anxiety, but it also helps overcome the sense of unpredictability 
caused by the inaccurate coding of prediction errors. What was experi-
enced as salient is no longer seen as requiring attention, because the delu-
sion can explain it. Thus, the processes underlying automated and habitual 
learning can resume. This also makes sense of the persistence of delusions. 
The belief is reinforced every time a new prediction error is registered, 
given that it has become the default explanation of the unexpected data.
7 See for instance: “This general delusional atmosphere with all its vagueness of content 
must be unbearable. Patients obviously suffer terribly under it and to reach some definite 
idea at last is like being relieved of some enormous burden […] The achievement brings 
strength and comfort […] No dread is worse than that of danger unknown” (Jaspers, 1963, 
p. 98).
8 See for instance: “Delusion formation can be seen as an adaptive process of attributing 
meaning to experience through which order and security are gained, the novel experience is 
incorporated within the patient’s conceptual framework, and the occult potential of its 
unknownness is defused” (Roberts, 1992, p. 305).
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The delusions […] involve a ‘reorganization’ of the patient’s experience to 
maintain behavioral interaction with the environment despite the underly-
ing disruption to perceptual binding processes […] At the Aha-moment, the 
‘shear pin’ breaks, or as Conrad puts it, the patient is unable to shift 
‘reference- frame’ to consider the experience from another perspective. The 
delusion disables flexible, controlled conscious processing from continuing 
to monitor the mounting distress of the wanton prediction error during 
delusional mood and thus deters cascading toxicity. At the same time, auto-
matic habitual responses are preserved, possibly even enhanced. (Mishara & 
Corlett, 2009, p. 531)
We saw in this section that delusions can play an adaptive role, by offer-
ing psychological relief from negative emotions and by restoring an epis-
temically beneficial engagement with reality (Bortolotti, 2016) after the 
severe disruption due to hypersalience. The consideration of these positive 
effects prompts us to challenge the claim that epistemically irrational 
beliefs cannot be good for us.
4.7  “irrationaL BeLiefs are the exception”
We saw that delusions are paradigmatic examples of epistemically irrational 
beliefs. But not all epistemically rational beliefs are unusual or infrequent. 
Although the type of delusional belief that attracts the attention of health-
care professionals is relatively rare, beliefs that satisfy the conditions for 
epistemic rationality and share significant epistemic features with delusions 
can be easily found in the non-clinical population. The prejudiced belief 
that members of a certain ethnic group are violent or lazy is not obviously 
less epistemically irrational than the delusional belief that our neighbor is 
a spy paid by the government to follow our movements. Superstitious 
beliefs about nights of full moon causing accidents share many of the epis-
temic features of delusions: they are badly supported by the available evi-
dence, and they are resistant to counterevidence and counterargument. 
The reason why prejudiced and superstitious beliefs come across as less 
puzzling than delusions is that they very widespread and not particularly 
distressing to those who report them.9 Here I am going to focus on the 
literature suggesting that we have a tendency to adopt self-enhancing 
9 See Bortolotti (2009, chapter 3) for a more comprehensive discussion of non-delusional 
beliefs that are epistemically irrational.
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beliefs and make overly optimistic predictions about our future (Jefferson, 
Bortolotti, & Kuzmanovic, 2017).
Different types of ‘positive illusions’ are discussed in psychology 
(Taylor, 1989). We experience the illusion of control when we overestimate 
our capacity to control independent, external events. We think that we 
have a better chance at winning when we roll the dice in a betting situa-
tion. We experience the better-than-average effect or have the illusion of 
superiority when we regard ourselves as above average and overrate our 
performance relative to others in a variety of domains. For instance, many 
believe that they are above average drivers. The optimism bias is a tendency 
to predict that our future will be largely positive and will yield progress, 
and that negative events will not be part of our lives. We all underestimate 
the likelihood of experiencing divorce or developing a serious health con-
dition during our lives.
Are optimistically biased beliefs an instance of irrationality? Here is a 
reminder that epistemically irrational beliefs can be either true or false, but 
what makes them irrational is that they are not well supported by the 
 evidence available to us or are insufficiently responsive to new evidence 
after being adopted. Unrealistically optimistic beliefs fit this description. 
Often the evidence on which we base our self-related judgements is biased, 
in that we tend to remember our past successes and forget our failures, or 
we tend to interpret negative feedback in a positive light. Moreover, we 
asymmetrically update beliefs about ourselves, taking into account evi-
dence for desirable outcomes but ignoring evidence for undesirable out-
comes (Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011). There is an element of motivationally 
driven distortion of the evidence in the way unrealistically optimistic 
beliefs are adopted.
To some extent, optimistically biased beliefs can be modified. It has 
been shown that there are interventions that are at least partially successful 
in reducing or controlling the extent to which self-related beliefs and pre-
dictions are optimistic. For instance, via introspective reflection we can 
control self-enhancing beliefs at least in the short-term, and self- assessment 
and predictions about our future are more accurate when we are held 
accountable for our judgements (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007).
Shelley Taylor makes the explicit claim that optimistically biased beliefs 
are not as fixed as delusional beliefs are, but are flexible and can be adjusted 
(Taylor, 1989). As we saw, we are known to update our self-related predic-
tions in the light of new evidence, but we tend to do so to a greater extent 
when the new information is desirable and indicates that our previous 
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estimates were pessimistic. Moreover, we tend to be more optimistic about 
events that we know we can partially control, and less optimistic just 
before receiving outcome feedback (Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006). 
While we may give up our optimistic predictions in order to brace for bad 
news, we also tend to avoid situations that would cause disappointment, 
that is, situations in which our optimistic beliefs and predictions could be 
easily disproved (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Neff & Geers, 2013). Although 
this is evidence of some flexibility in optimistically biased beliefs, it does 
not support the claim that we are responsive to evidence in an epistemi-
cally rational way when it comes to self-related beliefs and predictions. 
Rather, the hypothesis is that optimism is strategically enhanced when 
fewer opportunities for it to be disconfirmed are available.
4.8  concLusion
Here is what we have learnt from delusions: (1) it is not safe to assume that 
epistemically irrational beliefs compromise interpretation as it is possible 
for others to make sense of our behaviour by attributing delusional beliefs 
to us; (2) it is true that epistemically irrational beliefs can be harmful, and 
delusions often are very harmful and disruptive, but we should also be 
open to the possibility that they may have some benefits from a psycho-
logical and epistemic point of view, and this might mean that to challenge 
them is not always the best course of action; (3) epistemically irrational 
beliefs are not rare and there are many beliefs that share the same epistemic 
features of delusions but are widespread in the non-clinical population.
Why does all of this matter? Suppose that the attribution of epistemi-
cally irrational beliefs contributes to our attempts to explain and pre-
dict  each other’s behaviour, and adopting some of these epistemically 
irrational beliefs is instrumental to our maintaining some engagement 
with the surrounding environment in critical situations, irrespective of 
whether the beliefs are unusual or mundane. Then, there are wide-ranging 
implications for philosophy, but also for our conception of delusions as 
symptoms of a mental health issue.
First, as philosophers who intend to gain a better understanding of the 
workings of the mind, we should be ready to reassess the nature of the 
links that we identify between core concepts. What is the relationship 
between rationality and interpretation, rationality and happiness, rational-
ity and knowledge, rationality and success? Such questions have no 
straight-forward or general answer. We may find it intuitive and coherent 
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with other things that we believe that irrationality leads to the paralysis of 
interpretation, ignorance, and misery, and in some cases that will happen. 
But if that is not always the case, then we should get to work and identify 
the more complex relationships there may be between having beliefs that 
are ill-grounded and impervious to counterevidence, and the goals we 
pursue in our lives. In what circumstances is an irrational belief important 
to us, enabling us to engage successfully with our environment? In what 
circumstances is it so harmful and disruptive that we should attempt to get 
rid of it as soon as we can?
Second, it is not obvious that epistemically irrational beliefs should be 
corrected, challenged, or regarded as a glitch in an otherwise rational 
belief system. The whole attitude towards such beliefs should change. We 
all have many epistemically irrational beliefs, and they are not always a sign 
that we lack credibility or we are mentally unwell. Rather, they are predict-
able features of human cognition (Puddifoot and Bortolotti, 2018). We 
are not unbiased in the way we weigh up evidence and we tend to be con-
servative once we have adopted a belief, making it hard for new contrary 
evidence to unsettle our existing convictions. Some delusions are just a 
vivid illustration of a general tendency that is widely shared and hard to 
counteract. Delusions, just like more common epistemically irrational 
beliefs, may be a significant obstacle to the achievements of our goals and 
may cause a rift between our way of seeing the world and other people’s 
way. That is why it is important to develop a critical attitude towards their 
content. But it would be reckless not to acknowledge that there are situa-
tions in which such beliefs have a role to play, maybe allowing us to man-
age some very strong emotions or to respond to some adverse events that 
have a dramatic impact on our lives. In such situations, dismissing the 
belief as a mark of madness may not be the best course of action; at least, 
not before there is some understanding of how the belief emerged, and 
what role it has in our mental economy.
The picture I have sketched is a picture of continuity between so-called 
normal and abnormal cognition. Irrationality is a feature of normal cogni-
tion, and as such it cannot be the criterion of demarcation between beliefs 
that are ‘healthy’ and beliefs that are ‘pathological’. In recent years, there 
have been many attempts to explain the pathological nature of delusions, 
and the general direction of such attempts has been to identify the prob-
lem with something other than the epistemic features of the delusional 
belief. For instance, Miyazono (2015) defends the view that delusions 
are  pathological because they are harmful dysfunctions, that is, they 
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are beliefs that negatively affect wellbeing and are caused by mechanisms 
that do not work properly. According to another account, by Petrolini 
(2017), the pathological nature of delusions is due to the person losing 
the capacity for relevance detection, that is, the capacity to determine 
which aspects of the environment are important within a given context.
These are interesting proposals which elucidate some aspects of delu-
sions and deserve further consideration. But here is a more radical sugges-
tion, maybe anticipating a new potential contribution that delusion 
research could make to the philosophy of the mind. What if there are no 
pathological beliefs? What if the locus of any pathology is the person as a 
whole? When the person is unwell, then there is a pathological state that 
needs to be addressed in order to restore health. The pathological state 
can manifest with unusual beliefs, hallucinations, emotional dysregulation, 
and so on, but such beliefs, experiences, and mood changes are not them-
selves pathological, as in other circumstances they may not cause any 
harm. It is in the context of what happens to the person as a whole that 
their role as symptoms can be assessed, and even when they contribute to 
the pathological state, they may have other roles to play that are either 
neutral or even positive in some respects.
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